Short selling and price discovery in corporate bonds by Hendershott, Terrence et al.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/108473                            
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
1 
 
 
 
Short Selling and Price Discovery in Corporate Bonds 
 
Terrence Hendershott*   Roman Kozhan**  Vikas Raman*** 
 
Abstract 
 
We show short selling in corporate bonds forecasts future bond returns. Short selling predicts bond 
returns where private information is more likely, in high-yield bonds, particularly after Lehman’s 
collapse. Short selling predicts returns following both high and low past bond returns. This, together 
with short selling increasing following past buying order imbalances, suggests short sellers trade against 
price pressures as well as trade on information. Short selling predicts bond returns both in the individual 
bonds that are shorted and in other bonds by the same issuer. Past stock returns and short selling in 
stocks predict bond returns, but do not eliminate bond short selling predicting bond returns. Bond short 
selling does not predict the issuer’s stock returns. These results show bond short sellers contribute to 
efficient bond prices and that short sellers’ information flows from stocks to bonds, but not from bonds 
to stocks. 
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1. Introduction 
A significant element in firms’ choice of capital structure and security design is the 
relative informational sensitivity of equity and debt (for example, Myers and Majluf, 1984, 
Innes, 1990, and Freiwald, Hennessy, and Jankowitsch, 2016). This same informational 
sensitivity should manifest itself in securities markets through informed trading and price 
discovery across related assets. Numerous papers examine where price discovery occurs across 
related assets, e.g., options versus the underlying stock, credit default swaps versus bonds, and 
stocks versus bonds. We extend the study of price discovery across stocks and bonds by 
examining how a group of traders known to be informed, short sellers, impact price discovery 
in bonds and between stocks and bonds.  
While there is a substantial literature on the importance of short selling in stocks, the 
literature on short selling in bonds is much more limited and primarily examines the nature and 
determinants of borrowing costs in the bond market. Asquith et al. (2013) briefly study the 
informativeness of short sellers between 2004 and 2007 and find no evidence of short sellers 
being informed. For our sample period prior to Lehman’s 2008 collapse we also find a weak 
relationship between the level of shorting in bonds, as measured by short interest, and 
subsequent bond returns. However, after Lehman’s collapse we find that short interest predicts 
bond returns in high-yield bonds. In the second half of 2008 bonds in the most shorted quintile 
underperform bonds in least shorted quintile by almost ten percent annually. For high-yield 
bonds during this period, bonds in the most shorted quintile underperform bonds in least 
shorted quintile by more than fifty percent annually. From 2009 to 2011 heavily shorted high-
yield bonds underperform lightly shorted high-yield bonds by almost 25 percent annually. We 
find little evidence that short interest predicts returns in investment-grade bonds.  
The portfolio sort results of short selling predicting bond returns continue to hold in cross-
sectional regressions with other predictors of bond returns, such as past order imbalance 
(customer buy minus sell volume) and past bond returns. Both short interest in the individual 
bonds as well as short interest across all bonds in a firm predict future bonds returns. As with 
the portfolio sorts, short interest predicts returns more post-Lehman and in high-yield bonds. 
Double sorting on past bond returns and short interest shows that shorting predicts returns 
following both high and low past bond returns. Together with short interest increasing 
following past buying order imbalances, this suggests that short sellers trade against price 
pressures as well as trade on information. The double sort results are also stronger post-
Lehman and in high-yield bonds. Overall, these results are consistent with informed trading 
3 
 
models, e.g., Kyle (1985), where informed traders trade in the direction of the difference 
between their signal of value and the price, and price impacts are higher in assets and at times 
with greater uncertainty about value.  
We also examine short selling and price discovery within and across stocks and bonds. 
Past stock returns and short selling in stocks predict bond returns, but do not eliminate bond 
short selling predicting bond returns. The magnitude of the coefficient on stock short interest is 
similar to the magnitude of the coefficient on bond short interest. A 10% increase in bond short 
interest and stock short interest both correspond to 3-4% decrease in average abnormal bond 
returns. Bond short selling does not predict the issuer’s stock returns. 1 As with the within 
bonds price discovery analysis, the predictability results are stronger post-Lehman and in firms 
with high-yield bonds. These results show bond short sellers contribute to efficient bond prices 
and that short sellers’ information flows from stocks to bonds, but not from bonds to stocks. In 
addition, the price discovery relations between bonds and stocks is stronger post-Lehman and 
in smaller firms. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on 
short selling in stocks and bonds and price discovery between stocks and bonds. Section 3 
describes the data. Section 4 examines short selling and future returns in the cross section of 
bonds. Section 5 studies future returns and short selling conditional on past returns. Section 6 
analyzes the relations among short selling in stocks and bonds and future returns in stocks and 
bonds. Section 7 studies what leads to higher short selling in bonds. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Our paper is related to short selling in general,2 informed trading in bond markets, price 
discovery in stocks and bonds, and the impact of the financial crisis and Lehman’s collapse on 
price discovery and efficiency. There is limited prior evidence regarding whether short selling 
in bonds is informative. Our results indicate that the informativeness of short sellers varies over 
time and in the cross-section of bonds and that short sellers are informed over the post-Lehman 
period in high-yield bonds. Hence, our results are not inconsistent with Asquith et al. (2013), 
but indicate that short selling’s role in bond price discovery is a more recent phenomenon. 
                                                          
1There are a few possible reasons why stock short selling predicts bond return while bond short selling does not 
predict stock returns. First, trading costs for bonds are higher in our sample. Second, bond trading is not 
anonymous while stock trading is anonymous and informed traders prefer anonymity.   
2 The ability of short sellers to identify overvalued or “suspicious” stocks is well studied in stocks, e.g., Senchack 
and Starks (1993); Dechow et al. (2001); Christophe et al. (2004); Asquith et al. (2005); Desai et al. (2006); 
Cohen et al., (2007), Boehmer et al. (2008), Dieter et al. (2009), Christophe et al. (2010); Karpoff and Lou, 
(2010); Engelberg et al. (2012), Hirshleifer et al. (2011), Boehmer and Wu (2013), Ljungqvist and Qian (2014), 
Richardson et al. (2016). Where possible our empirical approaches are based on the stock short selling literature. 
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Short selling’s contribution to price discovery is concentrated in high-yield bonds, which have 
payoff structures more similar to equity. Our results also extend the literature on informed 
trading in the corporate bond market (e.g., Kedia and Zhou, 2014; Han and Zhou, 2014; and 
Wei and Zhou, 2016) by systematically examining group of traders thought to be informed, 
short sellers. 
The theoretical results regarding equity being more sensitive to information than debt 
suggest that price discovery about the value of a firm should occur more in the stock market. 
However, the literature contains mixed results regarding the relative informational efficiency of 
bond and stock markets and whether stock returns lead bond returns. Kwan (1996), Alexander, 
Edwards, and Ferri (2000), and Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009) conclude that stock 
markets lead bond markets. On the other hand, Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), Ronen and Zhou 
(2013), and Kedia and Zhou (2014) find that bond markets are as informationally efficient as 
related equities. While our results are only about information that short sellers have, our 
findings suggest that short sellers incorporate some information in stock prices before bond 
prices, but do not incorporate information in bond prices before stock prices. 
Back and Crotty (2015) theoretically model informed trading in the stock and bond of a 
firm when there is information about both the mean asset returns and the volatility of the asset 
returns. These two sources of information have potentially different implications for the cross-
asset price impact of trading, e.g., the stock price impact of order flow in the bond market. 
Back and Crotty empirically measure these cross-asset price impacts and conclude that most 
information is about asset means. This suggests that informed short selling in bond and stock 
markets should positively predict cross-asset returns. We find this is true for stock short selling, 
but bond short selling does not predict stock returns. 
The financial crisis together with Lehman’s collapse increased uncertainty and pushed 
high-yield bonds closer to default, making their payoffs more similar to equity. In addition, the 
Lehman bankruptcy increased funding costs substantially (Brunnermeier, 2009), likely 
increasing frictions for arbitrage capital (Mitchell et al., 2007, and Mitchell and Pulvino, 2012). 
This leads to lower price efficiency and greater price distortions. The very large profitability in 
high-yield bonds following the Lehman bankruptcy is consistent with short sellers have greater 
opportunities due to increased informational sensitivity and reduced competition in those 
assets. The fact that short interest strongly predicts bond returns after both positive and 
negative abnormal returns is consistent with reduced competition in impounding new 
information into bond prices and in trading against mispricing to buying pressure. The 
predictability of short interest for high-yield bonds returns falls post-Lehman, but does not 
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disappear. We cannot determine whether this is due to a permanent change in the informational 
environment for high-yield bonds or in constraints in competitors to short sellers, e.g., banks 
having reducing capital for trading and banking regulatory changes. 
 
3. Sample and Summary Statistics 
Our sample of corporate bonds lending and loans data comes from the Markit securities 
lending database. Markit collects this information from a significant number of the largest 
custodians and prime brokers in the securities lending industry. The dataset covers security-
level daily information for the U.S. corporate bonds for the period from January 2006 to 
December 2011. It contains lending fees, the number of bonds available for lending, the 
number of bonds on loan, and the number of lending-borrowing transactions.  
Asquith et al. (2013) describe the primary purpose of borrowing a corporate bond is to 
facilitate its short sale. Asquith et al. (2013) classify three main reasons for shorting corporate 
bonds: market making (provide liquidity to the liquidity demanders), speculation (to bet that 
the security will decline in price) and arbitrage (capital structure arbitrage or CDS arbitrage). In 
order to sell a bond short, one has to locate it, post collateral, and borrow it. Investors usually 
borrow bonds through a custodian bank who serves as an intermediary for the transaction. The 
collateral usually exceeds the value of the borrowed security (usually 102%) to protect the 
lender against the counterparty risk. When the bond loan is terminated the borrower returns the 
bond to its owner and receives collateral plus interest. Since naked short selling is prohibited in 
the corporate bond market, we estimate short interest based on the number of bonds borrowed 
(similar is done in the literature on stock shorting that employs lending and borrowing data). 
Short selling in equity markets experienced a large number of regulatory restrictions and 
bans during our sample period: the short selling ban in 2008 in the US market, the FSA’s short 
selling ban of financial stocks in the UK in 2008, and short selling bans of financial stocks in 
France, Italy, Spain and Belgium 2011 (Beber and Pagano, 2013). However, there were no 
such restrictions imposed on short selling in the U.S. corporate bond market.  
We match our sample with the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine database 
(TRACE) and the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). TRACE is a database of all over-
the-counter (OTC) corporate bond transactions that reports the time, price, and quantity of 
bond trades as well as information on the trading. It also includes information on the trading 
direction, an indicator for the side of a trade that the reporting party (a dealer) takes. The FISD 
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database contains detailed information on all corporate bond issues including the offering 
amount, issue date, maturity date, coupon rate, and Moody’s bond rating. 
We exclude any corporate bond in the Markit bonds lending file that we cannot match to 
FISD and TRACE. In addition we also exclude all convertibles, exchangeables, equity-linked 
bonds, and unit deals. We apply a standard filter in the literature, described in Bessembinder et 
al. (2009), to eliminate cancelled, corrected, and commission trades from the data.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
We use the following variables in our analysis (see also Table 1 for variables definition). 
We define the short interest of a bond (𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜) as the daily number of bonds on loan 
(shorted) to the number of bonds outstanding. Short interest of a firm excluding the current 
bond issue is defined as average value-weighted ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan 
(shorted) to the number of bonds outstanding for all bonds issues by the firm except the current 
issue. The lending fee (𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒௧௜) is defined as the interest rate on cash funds minus the 
rebate rate (that is paid for collateral). The raw return on bond i  is computed as  
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where itAI  is accrued interest and 
i
tP  is last traded price of the bond. The daily abnormal return 
on bond i  (𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ ) is computed as the difference between the raw return on the bond and 
the raw return on the corresponding rating matching portfolio based on six major rating 
categories: Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, and B. Hereafter, we refer to abnormal returns simply as 
returns. We use absolute daily return as a proxy for bond return volatility (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ ). We 
define daily order imbalance (𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ ) as the daily difference between customer buy and sell 
trading volumes scaled by the total trading volume. Realized spread (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑௧௜) is the 
daily average price at which customers buy minus the average price at which sell scaled by the 
average of the buy and sell prices. Turnover (𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ ) is defined as the total daily number 
of bonds traded scaled by the total number of bonds outstanding.  
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for short interest and other variables used in the 
analysis for all bonds in our sample. For the period from 2006 to 2011, the number of bonds in 
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the merged database is 15,093. We have 12,654 of investment-grade bonds (rated Baa3 and 
above) and 5,112 of high-yield bonds (rated below Baa3) throughout the sample period. Figure 
1 shows the number of bonds lent against calendar years. This number is relatively stable over 
time with a slight steady increase throughout the sample period. The average par value of 
corporate bonds outstanding during the period 2006–2011 is $6.8 trillion, or about $563 
million per issue. There is substantial amount of short interest in the corporate bond market. 
During our sample, there were on average about $1.35 trillion in bonds available to borrow, out 
of which about $125 billion were actually lent out and shorted subsequently. This corresponds 
to an amount shorted divided by size at value of around 1.86% and the utilization of about 
7.4% (an amount shorted to an amount available for lending).  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
On average, the short interest is slightly larger for investment-grade bonds than for high-
yield bonds in the pre-Lehman bankruptcy period, 2.90% vs. 2.83%, respectively. After 
Lehman’s collapse, the short interest drops for both types of bonds, and investment-grade 
bonds short interest becomes lower than that of high-yield bonds, 1.13% vs. 1.45%, 
respectively. Figure 2 plots the time series of the short interests across our sample. The short 
interest is steadily increasing from 2006 to until the Lehman bankruptcy when it spiked up to 
3.5% and then dropped to about 1% for investment-grade bonds and to about 1.5% for high-
yield bonds in matters of weeks and remained on that level until the end of the sample, possibly 
in response to TARP announcements after the Lehman bankruptcy. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
For investment-grade bonds, the average value-weighted lending fee is about 15.08 basis 
points per annum during the pre-Lehman period and is about 8.97 basis points in the post-
Lehman periods. High-yield bonds are on average more expensive to borrow than investment-
grade bonds. The lending fees for high-yield bonds decrease from about 40.8 basis points in the 
pre-Lehman period to 34.07. Panel A of Figure 3 depicts time series of lending fees during our 
sample. The average lending fee was steadily decreasing from 2006 to the beginning of 2008, 
then spikes dramatically during Lehman bankruptcy, and then quickly drops after a few 
months. The difference between lending fees of investment grade bonds and high-yield bonds 
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is due to a subset of high-yield bonds that are particularly expensive to short. Panel B of Figure 
3 shows that medians of lending fees are not very much different across credit ratings. 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
High-yield bonds are not only more expensive to short but they are also riskier with an 
average annualized volatility of daily returns of 114.56% as compared to 75.49% volatility of 
investment-grade bonds in the pre-Lehman period. Volatility of both types of bonds 
dramatically increases in the post-Lehman period, 188.74% and 133.61% for high-yield and 
investment-grade bonds, respectively. In addition, high-yield bonds have a larger trading costs 
in the pre-Lehman period, a realized spread of 0.92% for high-yield bonds and 0.75% for 
investment-grade bonds. The cost of trading increases in the post-Lehman for both types of 
bonds to 1.50% and 1.15% for high-yield and investment-grade bonds, respectively (as in 
Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando, 2012, and Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam, 
2012). Panel C of Figure 3 shows that the spreads increase sharply during Lehman bankruptcy 
period.3 This drop in liquidity is consistent with the evidence that the conventional market 
makers substantially reduced their inventories in the corporate bond market during the 4th 
quarter of 2008. While liquidity improves in 2009 onwards, it never comes back to the pre-
crisis level, especially for high-yield bonds. Finally, high-yield bonds are less liquid in the pre-
Lehman period as measured by the turnover as well, 0.55% for high-yield bonds versus 0.61% 
for investment-grade bonds. Turnover and trading volume decrease after Lehman bankruptcy 
for both types of bonds. 
Investment-grade bonds are bought more aggressively than sold, while the opposite is true 
for high-yield bonds. In the pre-crisis period, order imbalance for investment-grade bonds is 
about 6.13% while for high-yield bonds it equals to -4.89%. In the post-crisis period order 
imbalance decrease in absolute value, to 1.19% for investment-grade bonds and to -1.89% for 
high-yield bonds. 
Panels B and C of Table 2 present correlations among variables of interest for investment-
grade bonds (Panel B) and high-yield bonds (Panel C). To be consistent with our subsequent 
regression methodology we compute correlations first cross-sectionally every day and then 
averaged across time. Standard errors for correlations are calculated using Newey–West with 
                                                          
3 The peaks and declines in illiquidity in investment-grade and high-yield bonds are not simultaneous. The later 
spike in high-yield trading costs could arise from the interaction of two different effects. First, the market 
gradually learned that the economy was steadily deteriorating. Second, the government appeared more willing to 
bail out larger firms. The first effect could cause liquidity to decline for all bonds. The second effect would cause 
liquidity to improve for only larger firms’ bonds, which are more likely to be investment grade.   
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20 lags. Bond returns exhibit no significant autocorrelation for investment-grade bonds and are 
positively auto-correlated for high-yield bonds. Consistent with the hypothesis that bond short 
selling is informative of future bond returns in more informationally sensitive bonds, we find 
that bond returns negatively correlate with past bond short interest for high-yield bonds. We 
also report correlations between bond returns and past shorting in the rest of the bonds of the 
firm. We find that investment-grade bond returns are not correlated with past short interest of 
the rest of the bonds of the corresponding firm while high-yield bonds exhibit negative and 
significant correlation.  
The correlation between bond returns and past order imbalance is negative for both 
investment-grade and high-yield bonds. This is consistent with order flow causing price 
pressures that are profit opportunities for informed traders. Bond returns are positively 
correlated with past volatility and are not correlated with contemporaneous volatility. Short 
interest of individual bond is positively correlated with the short interest of the remaining 
issues of the same firm, consistent with informed traders shorting multiple bonds by the same 
issuer.  
 
4. The Cross-Section of Shorting and Future Returns  
4.1 Portfolio analysis: simple sorts 
We first examine how informed short sellers are in the corporate bond market. While there 
is a large literature documenting profitability of short selling strategies in the equity markets, to 
our knowledge only Asquith et al. (2013) study this question in the corporate bond market. 
Based on their 2004 to 2007 sample, they conclude that the short sellers are not informed in the 
corporate bond markets. This sample period is a relatively quiet period with no major market 
stresses and crisis. We study whether the informativeness of short sellers increases during and 
after the Lehman bankruptcy.  
If short sellers are informed, the bonds they short heavily should underperform the bonds 
they avoid shorting. To test this we follow the methodology used by Boehmer et al. (2008) by 
sorting bonds into portfolios based on their short interest. Each day we sort bonds into quintiles 
based on their short interest that day. We skip one day and then hold an equal-weighted 
portfolio of those bonds for 20 trading days. Therefore, on any given trading day for each 
quintile we hold 20 portfolios selected on the current day as well as on the previous 19 days, so 
there are overlapping 20-day holding period returns. Following Boehmer et al. (2008), we use a 
calendar-time approach to calculate average daily returns. Each trading day's portfolio return is 
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the simple average of 20 different daily portfolio returns, and 1/20 of the portfolio is revised 
each day while the rest of the portfolio is carried to the next day.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 shows the returns for each of the shorting quintile portfolios. The basic result is 
that short sellers are informed in the corporate bond market as short interest predicts 
subsequent bond returns. The returns on heavily shorted bonds are smaller than the returns of 
lightly shorted bonds, -2.21% per annum for quintile 5 vs. 2.74% for quintile 1.4 These returns 
suggest that short sellers are good at shorting overvalued bonds and at avoiding shorting 
undervalued bonds. Looking at the return differences, heavily shorted bonds significantly 
underperform lightly shorted bonds by an average of 4.96% per annum on a risk-adjusted basis. 
This value is statistically significant with the t-statistic 5.11. 
Table 3 also shows the returns of the shorting portfolios for the periods preceding (from 
January 1, 2006 until May 31, 2008) and following the Lehman bankruptcy (from January 1, 
2009 to December 30, 2011). We also separately report the results for the seven months around 
the Lehman collapse (from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008). We find that short sellers are 
significantly less informed prior to the Lehman bankruptcy as return differences between 
lightly and heavily shorted bonds are economically small (annualized returns of about 2.02%; it 
is however statistically significant at 5% level). The informativeness of short interest increases 
dramatically after the Lehman default. The trading strategy of buying bonds with low short 
interest and selling short bonds with a high short interest generates a return of 6.83% per 
annum with a t-statistic of 4.85. These returns are even higher during the Lehman bankruptcy 
episode (9.64% per annum). This is consistent with short sellers having greater incentive to 
acquire information during periods of market uncertainty. In addition to this, the short selling 
in the U.S. equity market has been banned immediately after the Lehman’s bankruptcy. Given 
that such restriction was absent in the U.S. corporate bond market, bond shorting could be a 
way for informed short sellers to avoid short sale restriction. We further elaborate on this point 
in Section 6.3. 
                                                          
4 A potential concern is that our results could be driven by outliers and data errors. To examine this, we identify 
potential data errors and eliminate them from the data. We use the following procedure to identify data errors. We 
identify days where a particular daily bond absolute return is in excess of 10% (approximately 0.5% of all 
observations) and promptly reverses during the following trading day. Specifically, we identify days when a 
greater than 10% absolute return is reversed on the next day when a trade occurs  by between 90% and 110% of 
the original return. These are classified as a potential data errors. We find that less than 8% of all large absolute 
returns (in excess of 10%) reverse in this way. Table IA1 in the Internet Appendix of shows that when these 
observations are excluded from the sample, the results remain virtually the same. 
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Insert Figure 4 about here 
 
Panel A of Figure 4 illustrates our findings. Returns of both heavily and lightly shorted 
portfolios are small before the Lehman bankruptcy and dramatically increase from 15th 
September 2008. High returns remained until middle of 2009. Thus, the evidence suggests that 
short sellers’ ability to identify over and undervalued bonds came to the fore during periods 
following the Lehman bankruptcy, which presented opportunities to exploit significant price 
dislocations. We perform additional tests related to this explanation in the subsequent sections.  
 
4.2 Investment-grade versus high-yield bonds 
Bonds closer to default are more informationally sensitive. To explore if this impacts the 
relation between short interest and future bond returns this section examines short interest 
separately for investment and high-yield bonds. To do so, we conduct double sorts based on 
credit ratings. We first sort bonds into two groups – investment grade and high-yield. Within a 
credit rating group, we then sort a second time into quintiles each day based on the short 
interest on a given day. As before, we skip one day and calculate value-weighted portfolio 
returns using a 20-day holding period. We roll forward one day and repeat the portfolio 
formation and return calculation process. Table 3 reports the annualized value-weighted risk-
adjusted returns for each portfolio as well as for the difference between the heavily-shorted and 
lightly-shorted quintiles for each characteristic group.  
Heavily-shorted high-yield bonds underperform lightly-shorted high-yield bonds. 
However, similar to our previous findings, the short interest predictability is mostly in the post-
Lehman bankruptcy period. The average return from this strategy for the pre-Lehman 
bankruptcy period is small and statistically insignificant, annual return of 2.07% on average 
with a t-statistic of 1.05. This is consistent with the finding of Asquith et al. (2013). However, 
when conditioning on the post-Lehman bankruptcy period, the heavily shorted high-yield 
bonds underperform lightly shorted high-yield bonds by a 24.12% annual average returns. This 
finding is illustrated in Panel C of Figure 4. 
We observe a different story for investment-grade bonds. The return difference between 
lightly- and heavily-shorted investment-grade bonds is economically negligible and statistically 
significant at 10% level only for the pre-Lehman period (see also Panel B of Figure 4 for the 
illustration). Thus, our results imply that the overall informativeness of short interest comes 
from the post-Lehman bankruptcy period and the high-yield bond market.  
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Furthermore, measuring bond returns is challenging due to infrequent trading and prices 
only being observed when trades occur. If there is little or no trading over days t+2 to t+21, 
then the returns to the long-short portfolio based on short interest may be underestimated 
because not all of the price adjustment is observed. If there is little or no trading over days t-20 
to t, then the returns to the long-short short-interest portfolio based could be overestimated if 
information that would have depressed bond prices is revealed and caused short selling before 
a trade occurs, i.e., the information causes the short sellers to increase their short position after 
the market would revise the price of a bond down, but this downward revision is not observed 
because there are no trades. To explore these potential effects we repeat the portfolio analysis 
using only heavily traded bonds. Table IA2 in the Internet Appendix shows that when thinly 
traded bonds are excluded from the sample, the results long-short portfolio returns become 
larger. 
 
4.3 Cross-sectional regressions 
The portfolio analysis limits the number of factors that can be simultaneously taken into 
account. Therefore, we extend our analysis using cross-sectional predictive regressions. Each 
day, we estimate the following cross-sectional predictive regression: 
 
            2, 21 1 2 3 20, 4 20,     ,
i i i i i i i
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tret bond short bond short firm ret bond oib bond X u  (1) 
 
where the set of control variables itX  includes volatility of bond returns (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ ), 
bond turnover (𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ ), log debt outstanding (𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜) and time-to-maturity 
(𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜ ). All variables are defined as in Table 1. The choice of variables follows from Boehmer 
et al. (2008). As in our portfolio exercise, we skip one day between returns and control 
variables to avoid econometric issues. We then average each coefficient over the time series. 
Similar to Boehmer et al. (2008), we use a Fama-MacBeth approach to conduct inference with 
Newey-West standard errors with 20 lags to account for the overlapping observations.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results for the full sample period, pre- and post-Lehman 
bankruptcy periods as well as for seven months around the Lehman bankruptcy itself. We 
estimate the regression for all bonds as well as for investment-grade and high-yield bonds 
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separately. To simplify reporting the results, we only include coefficient estimates and the 
corresponding t-statistics for 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ , 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ , and 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  variables. All 
coefficient estimates are in the Internet Appendix (Table IA3).  
Short selling significantly predicts negative returns in the cross-section: a 10% increase in 
short interest results in returns being lower by 8.3% per annum, on average. When controlling 
for 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ , and 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ , this coefficient drops to 4.6%. The coefficient for short 
interest is statistically significant at 5% level. Aggregate firm short interest conveys 
information about future bond returns beyond short interest in the individual bonds. A 10% 
increase in the short interest of the firms’ other bonds predicts a decrease in an average bond 
return by 11.9% per annum. More importantly, short interest in the post-Lehman bankruptcy 
period is about three times as informative as during the pre-Lehman bankruptcy period. 
Informativeness of firm short interest more than doubles in the post-Lehman bankruptcy 
period. This is consistent with the prior portfolio results.  
The short interest is not significantly related to future returns for investment-grade bonds 
during the overall period. It is statistically significant at 5% level in the pre-Lehman 
bankruptcy period (only when firm shorting is not included in the specification of the 
regression), but the economic magnitude is small: 10% increase in short interest for 
investment-grade bonds yields a drop in future returns by 0.8% per annum. In the post-Lehman 
bankruptcy and Lehman bankruptcy periods short interest is not significantly related to the 
future returns for investment-grade bonds. In contrast, the short interest and future returns 
relation is significantly negative across all periods for high-yield bonds. Again, short interest is 
about two and a half times as informative of future returns in the post-Lehman bankruptcy 
period than in the pre-Lehman bankruptcy period. For example, a 10% increase in short interest 
results in future return being lower by 15.3% and 45.9% in the post-Lehman bankruptcy and 
Lehman bankruptcy periods, respectively. In sum, the inclusion of other variables that predict 
bond returns does not impact the conclusion that short sellers are informed in the corporate 
bond market primarily in high-yield bonds in the Lehman bankruptcy and post-Lehman 
periods.  
The firm-level short interest (short interest of other bond issues by the same firm) also 
carries information about future returns of a specific bond beyond information in the short 
interest of that bond. The coefficient related to 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  is of a similar magnitude to the 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  coefficient and is also statistically significant at 1% level, except for investment-
grade bonds in the pre-Lehman bankruptcy and Lehman bankruptcy periods. Moreover, the 
informativeness of firm short interest is twice as large as that of bond short selling during the 
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Lehman period. As noted above, firm short interest does not subsume the effect of individual 
bond short interest.  
 
5. What Information Do Short Sellers Trade On? 
5.1 Portfolio analysis: double sorts on short interest and past returns 
The previous section show that short sellers in the corporate bond market predict future 
returns. We now examine what market conditions and kind of information short sellers base 
their trading strategies on. More specifically, we test whether short sellers appear to exploit 
temporary price overreaction (act against price pressures) or under-reaction to negative 
information.5 If it is only the former, we should find that short sales are informative only after 
high positive past returns. However, if short sellers are informative after negative past returns 
we can infer that they exploit negative information not yet in price.  
We start with performing portfolio analysis similar to Table 3. Each day, we double sort 
bonds into terciles based on the past 20 days returns and into quintiles based on the short 
interest on a given day. As before, we skip one day and then hold a value-weighted portfolio 
for 20 trading days.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Table 5 presents portfolio returns for different sample periods and bond categories. Short 
sales are informative after high past returns as well as after low negative returns. In the overall 
period of all bonds, a trading strategy that buys lightly shorted bonds with low past returns and 
sells heavily shorted bonds with low past returns generates on average 7.89% per annum (with 
t-statistic 6.13). Similar trading strategy conditioned on the past high returns produces 5.91% 
per annum (with t-statistic 4.89). The returns on a similar strategy conditioned on medium past 
returns are substantially lower – only 1.75% per annum and are only significant at 10% level. 
In the post-Lehman bankruptcy period, the returns of the strategies based on the low and high 
past returns increase to 9.37% and 7.41%, respectively.  
Strategies based on short interest generate much higher returns in high-yield bonds. During 
the post-Lehman bankruptcy period, a trading strategy that buys lightly-shorted high-yield 
bonds with low (high) past returns and sells heavily-shorted high-yield bonds with low (high) 
                                                          
5 A more formal analysis of how short selling relates to the efficient price and any pricing errors requires 
additional identifying assumptions (see, e.g., Hendershott and Menkveld, 2014) and is challenging given the 
frequency of bond trading.  
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past returns generates on average 24.85% per annum (30.72% per annum). A high-yield bonds 
based trading strategy conditioned on medium past returns also generates statistically 
significant returns in the post-Lehman bankruptcy period, but only 12.10%, less than half the 
magnitude of the other two strategies. Finally, analogous trading strategies for investment-
grade bonds generally do not produce statistically and economically significant returns.  
Overall, the results suggest that short sellers successfully capitalize on mispricing 
following positive returns and on information not yet incorporated into prices following 
negative returns. In both cases short sellers correct mispricing and incorporate information into 
bond prices.  
 
5.2 Cross-sectional return regressions: interacting short interest with past returns 
To examine whether the short interest predicting future return results conditional on past 
returns is driven by the omission of other variables that predict bond returns, we perform a 
cross-sectional regression analysis where we interact the bond short interest variable with past 
returns. We define dummy variables 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ ,௧௟௢௪  as follows. Each day t 
we sort bonds into terciles based on the returns over the past 20 trading days from t-20 to t. We 
define 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛ = 1 if the bond’s return over the past 20 trading days falls into the 
highest tercile and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛ = 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪ = 1 if the bond’s 
return over the past 20 trading days falls into the lowest tercile and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪ = 0 
otherwise. We continue to follow the Fama-MacBeth approach by estimating the following 
cross-sectional predictive regressions and averaging the time-series of the resulting coefficients 
over time: 
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where the set of control variables itX  includes volatility of bond returns (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ ), 
bond turnover (𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ ), log debt outstanding (𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜) and time-to-maturity 
(𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜ ).  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
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The estimation results are in Table 6 (see Table IA4 in the Internet Appendix for the 
complete set of coefficient estimates) and the conclusions are similar to those made based on 
the portfolio analysis. The coefficient in front of interaction variable 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ ×
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  is negative and statistically significant at 1% level in the “All Bonds” column 
of Panel A, implying that short sellers earn higher returns after low past returns as compared to 
the returns they earn after intermediate past returns. This is consistent with short sellers trading 
on negative information not yet in prices. In the pre-Lehman bankruptcy period there is weak 
evidence that short sellers can predict future negative return after negative past returns. 
However, the average returns to a short interest strategy are not significant, which is in line 
with our previous findings. In the post-Lehman bankruptcy period the coefficient on 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ × 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  is again negative and significant. The interaction term 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ × 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  positively predicts future bond returns. While the total effect of 
short interest is still negative after high positive returns (-0.72+0.37=-0.35), a greater 
proportion of the predictability in the post-Lehman period comes after large negative past 
returns.  
For investment-grade bonds, the returns to a short interest strategy are small. For the high-
yield bonds, coefficients in front of interaction variable 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ × 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  is again 
positive and significant (with total negative effect) while negative and significant for 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ × 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪ . Hence, short sellers appear to be more informed during days 
after large negative as compared to days after moderate and large positive returns.  
 
6. Bond versus Stock Short Selling: Where Do Short Sellers Contribute 
to Price Discovery? 
There is a large literature documenting short sellers’ information in equity markets. Given 
that both debt and equity are claims on the same firm, the question arises if the information in 
bond short interest in the previous section relates to the stock market. In other words, do bond 
short sellers remain informed after controlling for shorting and returns in stocks? To address 
this question we merge our sample of bond variables with the corresponding stock return, stock 
short interest and other stock characteristic variables, such as market capitalization, book-to-
market, and volatility.  
We match our sample with the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases and retain only firms 
that issue both bonds and common stock. We proxy for stock short sale interest by on-loan 
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value from borrowing-lending market. The corresponding data also comes from the Markit 
security lending database. We exclude any stock that does not enter Markit database at least 
once. 
We use the following stock variables in our analysis (see Panel B of Table 1 for variables 
definition). In particular, we define the short interest of stock i on day t (𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜) as the 
daily number of shares on loan (shorted) divided by the number of shares outstanding. The 
daily return on stock i  (𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜) is computed as the difference between the return on the 
stock and the return on the corresponding size and book-to-market matching portfolio (we sort 
stocks into five quintiles based on size and five quintiles based on book-to-market ratio). We 
use absolute daily return as a proxy for stock return volatility (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜). We define daily 
stock order imbalance (𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜) as the daily difference between buy and sell initiated 
trading volumes scaled by the total trading volume. Turnover (𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜) is defined as total 
daily number of stock shares traded scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Finally, we 
control for characteristics that proved to significantly predict stock returns in the cross-section. 
Specifically, we control for book-to-market ratio (𝑏𝑚௧௜ ), log size (𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒௧௜), leverage 
(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜) which is defined as a ratio of debt to stockholders total equity and institutional 
ownership (𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜) defined as the number of shares held by institutional investors as 
recorded in 13F filings scaled by the total number of shares outstanding (see Boehmer et al, 
2008; Christophe et. al. 2016).   
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
Table 7 provides summary statistics about stock short interest and other stock 
characteristics for the pre- and post-Lehman bankruptcy periods for all stocks and for the 
quintiles of the largest and smallest stocks with respect to the market capitalization. The 
number of firms in the merged database over our sample period is 1,401 which have 5,291 
bond issues.  
Panel A of Table 7 shows that small stocks’ shares are shorted about five times more than 
large stocks’ shares on average: in the pre-Lehman bankruptcy period short interest for small 
stocks equals 10.36% while only about 2.15% of large stocks are shorted. After the Lehman’s 
collapse, the short interest drops for small and large stocks to 5.69% and 1.52% respectively.  
Small stocks in our sample are much riskier than large stocks: the annualized volatility of 
daily returns for is 36.29% as compared to 8.77% volatility of large stocks in the pre-Lehman 
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bankruptcy period. Volatility of both types of stocks dramatically increases in the post-Lehman 
bankruptcy period, 20.36% and 79.38% for large and small stocks, respectively. In the pre-
Lehman bankruptcy period small stocks have higher turnover than large stocks, 1.15% versus 
0.85%, respectively. Turnover somewhat increases for large stocks and barely changes for 
small stocks after Lehman’s bankruptcy. In the pre-Lehman bankruptcy period, order 
imbalance for small stocks is about 0.05% while for large stocks it equals 1.19%. In the post-
Lehman bankruptcy period both types of stocks are sold more aggressively than bought as 
order imbalance becomes negative: -1.77% for small stocks and -0.24% for large stocks. 
Panels B and C of Table 7 present correlations among the variables of interest for large 
stocks (Panel B) and small stocks (Panel C). Stock returns exhibit no significant auto-
correlation but are positively correlated with the contemporaneous bond returns. Furthermore, 
returns on large stocks are negatively correlated with past stock short interest and are positively 
correlated with contemporaneous stock short interest. The contemporaneous correlation 
between returns and short interest for small stocks is negative and significant. Stock returns 
positively correlate with contemporaneous volatility and have zero correlation past volatility. 
The correlation between stock returns and past order imbalance is borderline positive and 
significant only for large stocks. 
The correlation between stock and bond short interest is positive and highly significant 
only for small stocks.6 Stock short interest has positive correlation with volatility and turnover 
for both large and small stocks and it positively correlates with order imbalance in large stocks. 
 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
 
Figure 5 plots time series of short interest in both bond and stock markets for our matched 
sample (Panel A) as well as short interest for small and large stocks and their corresponding 
bonds (Panel B and C). In both markets short interest significantly dropped after Lehman 
bankruptcy. There was a steady increase in short interest prior to Lehman’s collapse and post-
Lehman shorting dropped below its pre-Lehman level. Differently from shorting in the equity 
market, the level of bond shorting decreased below the pre-Lehman level and does not recover 
to its pre-Lehman level until the end of the sample.   
 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
                                                          
6 Back and Crotty (2015) find total order imbalances in the stock and bonds of the same firm are positively 
contemporaneously correlated. 
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Figure 6 plots the time series of lending fees and trading costs (as measured by realized 
spreads) in both bond and equity markets. On average, equity lending fees are higher than bond 
lending fees (Panel A of Figure 6). Consistent with increasing demand in the equity short selling, 
the equity lending fees exhibit a positive trend prior to the Lehman collapse. The lending fees in 
both markets sharply dropped in the post-Lehman period along with the shorting demands. Panel 
B of Figure 6 plots medians of the lending fees. Unlike the comparison of mean lending fees, 
median lending fees’ in equity and bond markets are quite similar. Moreover, the median of the 
equity lending fees does not experience positive trend in the pre-Lehman period suggesting that 
the abovementioned trend is due to an increase in borrowing costs for a subset of stocks. The 
median of both equity and bond lending fees experienced sharp drop after Lehman’s collapse and 
partially recovered only in the first quarter of 2010.  
It is about ten times more expensive to trade corporate bonds than the corresponding 
equity as measured by the realize spreads (see Panel C of Figure 6). The average realized 
spread in both markets sharply increases during the Lehman episode and slowly falls back to 
the pre-Lehman levels in 2010. 
 
6.1 Cross-sectional bond return regressions: including stock short interest 
To analyze the relation between bond returns and stock short interest we extend the Fama-
MacBeth cross-sectional regressions from Table 4 with the addition of stock variables, 
including short interest: 
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In Equation (3), the index i runs over all individual bond issues in our sample. With slight 
abuse of notations we also index stock variables with index i meaning that 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  and 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  denote short interest and stock return of firm issued bond i. The set of control 
variables itX  includes volatility of bond returns (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ ), bond turnover 
(𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ ), log debt outstanding (𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜) and time-to-maturity (𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜ ), log market 
capitalization of firm issuing bond i (𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜), book-to-market ratio of firm i (𝑏𝑚௧௜ ), leverage 
ratio of bond i issuer (𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜) and institutional holding of firm issuing bond i (𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜). 
All stock and bonds variables are defined as in Table 1. As before, we estimate the regression 
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every day, average each coefficient across the time-series, and use Newey-West standard errors 
with 20 lags to account for the autocorrelation.  
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
The results are given in Table 8 (a full set of coefficient estimates are in Table IA5 in the 
Internet Appendix). The individual and firm bond short interest exhibit a significant negative 
relation to future bond returns even with the inclusion of the corresponding stock short interest. 
Specifically, a 10% increase in bond short interest results in returns being lower by 4.3% per 
annum, on average, and by about 3.4% when 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ , and 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  are included in 
the regression. This is about twice lower than the coefficient estimate reported in Table 4. 
Stock short selling also negatively predicts future bond returns: a 10% increase in stock short 
interest corresponds to 4.1% decrease in average abnormal bond returns. When we control for 
firm bond short interest, this value is reduced to 3.0%. 
While this predictability is present in the pre- and post-Lehman bankruptcy periods, the 
magnitude of the coefficient for bond short interest is about three times larger in the post-
Lehman period and about seven times larger during Lehman bankruptcy as compared to the 
pre-Lehman period. The coefficient on stock short interest is of similar magnitude as the 
coefficient on bond short interest. For high-yield bonds the stock short interest coefficient is 
four times larger than the bond short interest coefficient in the pre-Lehman period and of a 
similar magnitude in the post-Lehman period. We find that stock short interest does not predict 
future bond returns for investment grade bonds. 
Similar to bond short sellers, stock short sellers are informed about future bond returns in 
the post-Lehman periods and mainly in high-yield bonds. Bond short interest conditional on 
stock short interest continues to carry significant information statistically and economically in 
the post-Lehman periods, mainly in high-yield bonds. 
 
6.2 Cross-sectional stock return regressions 
Table 8 shows that stock short interest predicts bond returns. This could arise from short 
sellers shorting both debt and equity. In the more uncertain times and in the more risky firms 
the short sellers do not fully incorporate all their information into bond prices so short interest 
predicts bond returns. This result is in line with Christophe at. al (2016) findings. We now turn 
to the question of whether bond short interest contains information about future stock returns. 
We follow the same process as in Table 8 while replacing bond returns with stock returns, each 
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day we estimate the following cross-sectional stock return regression and perform Fama-
MacBeth inference with New-West standard errors: 
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where the set of control variables itX  includes stock return volatility (𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ ), 
turnover of stock i (𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ ), log market capitalization of firm i (𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜), book-to-
market ratio (𝑏𝑚௧௜ ), leverage ratio (𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜) and institutional ownership (𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜). Note 
that in this regression index i runs over firms rather than over individual bonds. 
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
Table 9 contains the estimation results (Table IA6 for all coefficient estimates including 
the control variables). Stock short interest negatively predicts future stock returns. In the full 
sample period for all stocks, a 10% increase in stock short interest results in a 7.5% decrease in 
stock returns per annum. This is consistent with the literature documenting the informativeness 
of stock short sellers in the stock market. The results hold in the pre-Lehman and post-Lehman 
periods with the magnitude of the coefficients in front of stock short selling remaining similar.  
For large stocks a 10% increase in short selling yields a 14.1% decline in future returns per 
annum. This is statistically significant at 1% level. In the pre-Lehman bankruptcy period a 10% 
increase in short selling yields 2.9% decrease in stock returns. All results are robust to 
including order imbalance and bond short selling. Stock short interest, however, becomes 
insignificant when only examining small stocks. This conflicts with the existing academic 
literature (see Boehmer et al., 2008). However, because we are also examining bond short 
interest our sample is different as we require each stock to have valid bond data as well as 
shorting variables for both stocks and bonds. 
Bond shorting is generally insignificant for all sub-periods and types of stocks considered. 
The only noticeable exception is in the pre-Lehman period for large stocks. This implies that 
bond short sellers generally are not informed about future stock returns. Moreover, bond short 
interest does not exhibit any significant relation with future stock returns even when stock short 
interest or stock order imbalance are not included in the specification.  
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In sum, bond and stock short sellers are informed about future bond returns and this 
informativeness comes mainly for high-yield bonds in the post-Lehman period. At the same 
time, stock short sellers are informed about future stock and bond returns while bond short 
sellers do not have information about future stock returns. 
There are a few possible reasons why bond short selling does not predict future stock 
returns while stock short selling does so. First, higher trading costs in corporate bonds as 
compared to stocks (Figure 6) likely discourage short sellers in the corporate bond market.  A 
second reason is that stock market trading is anonymous while bond trading is not. Informed 
traders generally prefer anonymity so their information in revealed more slowly, making stocks 
more attractive to short on private information.  
 
6.3 Bond shorting around equity short sale ban 
To further examine the relation between shorting in the stock and bond markets we 
examine the 2008 short-sale ban in equities. Unlike shorting in the equity market, there were no 
such restrictions imposed on short selling in the U.S. Corporate bond market. Battalio and 
Schultz (2011) show that equity options provided a mechanism to circumvent the short-sale 
restrictions/ban in the equity market. A natural question arises whether the corporate bond 
market also offers a mechanism to get around the short-sale restrictions/ban. We examine 
whether a substitution effect between stocks and bonds short selling during stock short selling 
ban. To do this, we merge our bond and stock short selling sample with the list of banned 
stocks. Given that many of banned stocks do not have bond counterpart in the FISD database, 
our sample contains 117 banned stock-bond issuers and 824 non-banned stock-bond issuers.  
We define the following variables for each firm: the difference between bond and stock 
short interest (𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡௧௜ = 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ − 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜); the difference between bond and 
stock net new shorting (𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡௧௜ = ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ − ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜), where net new 
shorting ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  and ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜   are measured as changes in daily short interests and 
expressed as a ratio of daily trading volume for bond and stock respectively; the difference 
between bond and stock shorting fees (𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑒𝑒௧௜ = 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ −
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜). 
 
We estimate the impact of the ban on substitution between stock and bond shorting by 
running the following pooled regression: 
 
𝑌௧௜ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑏𝑎𝑛௧ + 𝛼ଶ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡௜ + 𝛼ଷ𝑏𝑎𝑛௧ × 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡௜ + 𝑢௧௜ ,  (5) 
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where 𝑌௧௜ corresponds to one of the following three variables 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡௧௜  , 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡௧௜ and 
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑒𝑒௧௜. Control variables 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡௜ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the corresponding stock 
of firm i was banned from short selling by SEC between September 19, 2008 and October 7, 
2008 and zero otherwise; 𝑏𝑎𝑛௧ is a dummy variable equals to 1 if day t is between September 
19, 2008 and October 7, 2008 and zero otherwise. The sample period for the analysis starts on 
the August 1, 2008 and ends at the end of the ban on October 7, 2008. 
 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
Table 10 shows the coefficient on the interaction between event and ban is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level for net new shorting and shorting fees, and positive 
statistically significant at 5% level for short interest. The interaction coefficient measures the 
change between bond and stock short selling for banned firms during the ban. Furthermore, the 
interaction coefficient is also economically significant. For example, the interaction coefficient 
for the analysis of the difference in short interest is approximately 0.8%. Therefore, during the 
short-sale ban, the difference between bond and stock short interests for short-sale ban stocks 
changes by about 14% of the absolute value of its pre-event average (-5.8%). Similarly, the 
interaction co-efficient for the shorting fees analysis is 70.9 basis points, or approximately 2.75 
times the pre-event average of the difference in shorting fees for all bonds in the sample (-26.24 
basis points). Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that shorting activity in the 
shorting-ban stocks significantly migrated to the bond market. 
 
7. What Leads to an Increase in Bond Shorting? 
In this section we study what leads to an increase in bond short interest. Dieter, Werner 
and Lee (2009) examine this for stock short selling. Beyond short sellers speculating on 
negative information not in price, Dieter, Werner and Lee (2009) explore whether short sellers 
appear to be liquidity providers, either regularly or opportunistically. Liquidity provision by 
short seller should follow increases in prices and occurs opportunistically if liquidity provision 
is sensitive to the volatility of returns, as opposed to just the recent direction of returns. All of 
these motivations for short selling should predict future bond returns. 
In the previous section we provide evidence consistent with short sellers trading on both 
mispricing due to past buying pressure pushing prices too high and on negative information not 
yet impounded into prices. To examine these further, we regress short interest on past returns 
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and past order imbalance. Short interest increasing following buying is consistent with short 
sellers providing liquidity to correct over pricing due to price pressure. Tables 5 and 6 show 
that short interest predicts bond returns following both positive and negative abnormal returns. 
The relationship between past returns and short interest measures whether the short sellers are 
predominately trying to correct over or under pricing.  
Employing our Fama-MacBeth procedure on weekly variables, each day we estimate the 
following cross-sectional regression using various bond characteristics motivated by Dieter, 
Werner and Lee (2009) to explain future short interest: 
 
   
   
     
  
   
    
2, 6 1 5, 2 5, 3 5, 4 5,
5 5, 6 7 5, 8 5,
     
                        .
i high low i i
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
i i i i i
t t t t t t t t t t t t
short bond ret bond ret bond oib bond volat bond
turn bond lpardebt short bond short firm u
 (6) 
 
Following Dieter, Werner and Lee (2009), we include the past bond returns interest, order 
imbalance and volatility. Bond prices might increase due to a buying liquidity shock. Short 
sellers may act as voluntary liquidity providers expecting to benefit from negative returns they 
anticipate as prices revert in the near future. If short sellers act as voluntary liquidity providers 
we expect to see short sale interest to increase along with large positive trade imbalances. It is 
also possible that bond short sellers act as opportunistic risk bearers during periods of increased 
uncertainty (see Dieter, Werner and Lee, 2009). We also include lagged short interest for bonds 
and firms to account for time variation in short interest.  
 
Insert Table 11 about here 
 
Table 11 presents the estimation results of the predictive regression for the different 
sample periods and types of bonds.7 Short interest is significantly higher after large positive 
and large negative past returns than after intermediate returns. These differences are 
statistically significant at 1% level. This result is consistent with the previous finding that bond 
short sellers trade on both negative information not yet fully incorporated into prices as well as 
on overreaction to positive price pressures. Further, the results show that bond short interest is 
positively correlated with order imbalances as predicted by the voluntary liquidity provision 
                                                          
7 In Table IA7 in the Internet Appendix we also present the estimation results of the model where we include 
contemporaneous terns into the regression to control for potential autocorrelation of the predictors. The results are 
qualitatively similar. 
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hypothesis. The results also show that short interest is not predicted by lagged volatility. The 
results are similar for both investment grade and high-yield bonds. 
We also find evidence that short sellers trade on negative information not yet in prices, 
trade against positive price pressures and act as liquidity providers for high-yield bonds in both 
pre- and post-Lehman periods. The short volume response to past positive returns is twice 
smaller than to past negative returns in the pre-Lehman period. The response to past positive 
returns becomes about three times larger than the response to past negative returns in the post-
Lehman period.  
There is no significant relation between bond short interest and past positive returns for 
high-yield bonds in the pre-Lehman periods. This relation is positive and statistically 
significant in the post-Lehman period. This is consistent with the interpretation that after the 
Lehman bankruptcy short sellers traded more aggressively to exploit and correct for the 
overpricing due to temporary price pressures. 
During the Lehman bankruptcy period the relation between short interest and past returns 
dummies for high-yield bonds reverses and becomes negative (although insignificant). It could 
be that regular liquidity providers, such as banks, were constrained following Lehman’s 
bankruptcy and short sellers took their place. The relation of short interest with order 
imbalance remains positive and significant in the Lehman period. Interestingly, the past 
volatility negatively predicts future bond short interest in the Lehman period. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that, in periods of binding financial constraint, even short sellers 
are hesitant to sustain risky positions.  
 
8. Conclusions 
We provide novel evidence that short selling in corporate bonds forecasts future bond 
returns. Our findings are consistent with the capital structure and security design literature in 
several ways. First, short selling predicts bond returns where private information is more likely, 
in high-yield bonds. Second, short selling predicts bond returns when informational uncertainty 
is higher, around Lehman’s collapse (the second half of 2008) high-yield bonds in the most 
shorted quintile underperform bonds in least shorted quintile by more than fifty percent 
annually. However, these are the bonds and circumstances when shorting was the most difficult 
and expensive so capturing these returns is challenging. Third, when examining stocks and 
bonds together past stock returns and short selling in stocks predict bond returns, but do not 
eliminate bond short selling predicting bond returns. Bond short selling does not predict the 
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issuer’s stock returns. These results show bond short sellers contribute to efficient bond prices 
and that short sellers’ information flows from stocks to bonds, but not from bonds to stocks. 
Our findings suggest that research examining price discovery across related assets should 
carefully examine the time-series and cross-sectional properties. While assets classes with less 
information sensitivity may play a smaller role in price discovery, the mostly informationally 
sensitive securities in those asset classes may be important for price discovery and their role 
may be heightened at times of market stress.  
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 1: Variables Description 
Panel A: Bond Variables 
 
short bond  ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) to the number of bonds outstanding 
short firm average value-weighted ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) to the total 
number of bonds outstanding for all bonds issues by the firm except the current issue 
lending fee  average value-weighted (with respect to the loan quantity) lending fee is defined as the 
interest rate on cash funds minus the rebate rate (that is paid for collateral) 
ret bond bond abnormal return equals i it tR E R , where the expected return 
i
tE R  is the return from 
the corresponding rating matching portfolio and the bond raw return i
tR  equals 
  1 1/i i i it t t tP P AI P   , where itA I  is accrued interest and itP  is last traded price of the 
bond 
oib bond   order imbalance is daily difference between buy and sell trading volumes divided by the 
total trading volume 
volat bond volatility of bond returns is defined as the absolute value of the daily bond returns 
realized spread  realized spread is daily average buy price minus sell price of the bond scaled by the mid-
price of the two last buy and sell transactions 
turn bond turnover is total daily number of bonds traded scaled by the total number of bonds 
outstanding 
ttm time-to-maturity for the bond (expressed in years) 
 
Panel B: Stock Variables 
 
short stock  ratio of the daily number of shares on loan (shorted) to shares outstanding 
ret stock stock abnormal return i it tR E R  where 
i
tR  is the stocks raw return and 
i
tE R  is the 
expected return calculated as the return from the corresponding size and book-to-market 
matching portfolio 
oib stock   order imbalance is daily difference between buy and sell initiated trading volumes divided 
by the total trading volume 
volat stock volatility of stock returns is defined as the absolute value of the daily stock returns  
mcap market capitalization of the firm 
bm book-to-market ratio is lagged book value of equity divided by market value of equity 
turn stock turnover is total daily shares traded scaled by the total shares outstanding 
leverage leverage ratio is defined as the sum of long-term and short-term debts (ddlq + dlttq) divided 
by stockholders total equity (seqq) 
iholding institutional holding is defined as the number of shares held by institutional investors as 
recorded in 13F filings and are scaled by the total number of shares outstanding. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. The variables are computed for all corporate bonds in the Markit securities lending 
database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases over the interval January 1, 2006 to 
December 30, 2011. Daily statistics are first computed by security and descriptive statistics of those security averages are 
reported below. 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is a ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) to the number of bonds outstanding 
(in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  is an average value-weighted ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) to the number 
of bonds outstanding for all bonds issued by the firm except bond i (in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is annualized bond abnormal 
return defined as a raw return minus the return from the corresponding rating matching portfolio (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is 
trade imbalance defined as daily difference between buy and sell trading volumes scaled by the total trading volume of bond 
i (in percentage); 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is defined as absolute daily bond return (annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is 
total daily number of bonds traded scaled by the total amount of bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑡𝑟 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒௧௜ is total daily 
value of bonds traded (in US dollars); 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜ is the total number of bonds outstanding (in USD dollars); 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒௧௜ is 
average value-weighted (with respect to the loan quantity) lending fee is defined as the interest rate on cash funds minus the 
rebate rate (annualized and in basis points); 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑝𝑟௧௜ is daily average buy price minus sell price of the bond scaled by 
the mid-price of the two last buy and sell transactions (in percent). Panel A reports mean and standard deviation for 
investment-grade (rated by Moody’s ‘Baa3’and higher) and high-yield bonds for the pre-Lehman (from January 1, 2006 to 
May 31, 2008) and post-Lehman (from January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011) periods. Panels B and C report correlations 
among variables for investment and high-yield bonds respectively. Correlations are computed cross-sectionally every day 
and then averaged across time. Standard errors for correlations are autocorrelation adjusted using Newey–West with 20 lags. 
Panel A: Averages and Standard Deviations 
Investment-Grade Bonds   High-Yield Bonds 
Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  2.90% 0.29% 1.13% 0.20%   2.83% 0.33% 1.45% 0.24% 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  -1.02% 17.6% 7.10% 41.0%   0.20% 33.8% 23.5% 114.8% 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  6.13% 6.83% 1.19% 7.34%   -4.89% 6.62% -1.89% 6.44% 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  75.5% 24.6% 133.6% 75.8%   114.6% 29.7% 188.7% 168.5% 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  0.61% 0.22% 0.57% 0.36%   0.55% 0.13% 0.48% 0.18% 
𝑡𝑟 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒௧௜ 3,035,722 695,303 2,819,365 684,514   1,802,229 401,572 1,685,580 429,656 
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  441,240 17,221 512,970 18,878   308,763 8,100 340,142 4,592 
𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒௧௜  15.08 4.43 8.97 6.62   40.80 9.71 34.07 9.59 
𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑝𝑟௧௜ 0.75% 0.28% 1.15% 0.55%   0.92% 0.26% 1.50% 0.59% 
# 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 12,654 5,112 
 
Panel B: Correlations (Investment-Grade Bonds) 
Variable ret bondt-20,t short bondt short firmt oib bondt-20,t volatility bondt-20,t turnover bondt-20,t 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାଶ଴௜  -0.005 -0.000 0.001 -0.072*** 0.065*** 0.035 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  1 0.005 -0.008 -0.015*** 0.000 -0.003 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜   1 0.155*** -0.008*** 0.056*** 0.114*** 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜    1 -0.002 -0.003 0.020*** 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜     1 -0.011** -0.022*** 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜      1 0.015*** 
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Table 2 continued. 
Panel C: Correlations (High-Yield Bonds) 
Variable ret bondt-20,t short bondt short firmt oib bondt-20,t volatility bondt-20,t turnover bondt-20,t 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାଶ଴௜  0.063*** -0.021*** -0.018** -0.039*** 0.068*** 0.016* 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  1 -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.018*** -0.036 -0.028** 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜   1 0.288*** 0.007** 0.013*** 0.142*** 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜    1 0.010*** 0.030*** 0.057*** 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜     1 -0.005 0.012*** 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜      1 0.094*** 
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Table 3: Portfolio Returns and Short Interest 
This table presents returns for portfolios sorted based on short interest. Sample for Panel A consists of all corporate bonds in 
the Markit securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases over the 
interval January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011, the pre-Lehman period (Panel B) consists of all trading days from January 1, 
2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period (Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011 and the Lehman 
period (Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. Bonds are sorted every day into quintiles based on the daily 
short interest ratio. After skipping 1 day, value-weighted portfolios are held for 20 trading days. This process is repeated 
each trading day, so that each trading day’s portfolio return is an average of 20 different portfolios, with 1/20 of the portfolio 
rebalanced each day. Portfolio returns are credit rating matched and are defined as the difference between raw returns (the 
equal-weighted average of daily returns) and issue-size equal-weighted returns of bonds with similar credit rating, calculated 
as in Bessembinder et al. (2009). Returns are reported in percent multiplied by 252 to reflect an approximately annual return, 
with t-statistics based on the daily time series. Investment-grade bonds are defined as those rated by Moody’s ‘Baa3’and 
higher five days prior to the sorting while the rest of the bonds are categorized as high-yield bonds. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 2.74% (6.08)   0.48% (1.14)  8.85% (7.39) 
P2 -0.54% (-0.66)   -0.80% (-1.57) 3.45% (1.13) 
P3 -0.67% (-1.27)   -0.34% (-0.90) -1.00% (-0.57) 
P4 -0.57% (-0.97)   -0.03% (-0.07) -2.15% (-1.22) 
P5 (Most) -2.21% (-3.05)   -0.11% (-0.18)   -8.67% (-4.02) 
P1-P5 4.96% (5.11)  0.58% (0.64)  17.53% (7.17) 
                
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 0.50% (1.25)   0.68% (1.55) 0.05% (0.06) 
P2 -0.50% (-0.68)   -0.25% (-0.57) -1.26% (-0.92) 
P3 -0.25% (-0.74)   -0.25% (-0.81) 0.24% (0.32) 
P4 -0.25% (-0.52)   -0.25% (-0.56) 0.38% (0.40) 
P5 (Most) -1.51% (-2.14)   -1.26% (-1.90)   -2.02% (-1.32) 
P1-P5 2.02% (2.02)  1.94% (1.89)  2.07% (1.05) 
                
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 5.07% (7.69)   0.78% (1.31) 16.30% (9.63) 
P2 -0.04% (-0.04)   -0.76% (-1.23) 6.65% (1.60) 
P3 -0.50% (-1.17)   -0.76% (-1.58) 0.09% (0.05) 
P4 -0.25% (-0.50)   -0.50% (-0.89) -0.23% (-0.12) 
P5 (Most) -1.76% (-1.77)   0.13% (0.15)   -7.81% (-3.40) 
P1-P5 6.83% (4.85)  0.65% (0.48)  24.12% (7.78) 
                
Panel D: Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 0.40% (0.13)   -2.34% (-0.85) 9.41% (1.04) 
P2 -4.00% (-0.52)   -3.74% (-0.90) 7.77% (0.30) 
P3 -2.96% (-0.58)   1.08% (0.32) -13.6% (-0.75) 
P4 -3.27% (-0.67)   4.57% (1.32) -26.0% (-1.56) 
P5 (Most) -9.24% (-1.61)   3.86% (1.22)   -46.5% (-2.33) 
P1-P5 9.64% (1.45)  -6.20% (-1.16)  55.92% (2.85) 
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Table 4: Cross-Sectional Return Regressions 
This table presents Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting 20-day abnormal returns. Each day we estimate the following cross-sectional predictive regression: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଶ,௧ାଶଵ௜ = 𝛼଴௧ + 𝛼ଵ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ + 𝛼ଶ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ + 𝛼ଷ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛼ସ௧𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛾௧ 𝑋௧௜ + 𝑢௧௜ . 
We average then each coefficient over time-series dimension. The sample consists of all corporate bonds in the Markit securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in 
the FISD and TRACE databases from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011. Bonds with Moody’s credit rating of ‘Baa-3’ and higher five days prior to the sorting are categorized as 
Investment-Grade Bonds; others are categorized as High-Yield Bonds. Pre-Lehman period (Panel B) consists of all trading days from  January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period 
(Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. Dependent variable is a simple average of abnormal bond 
returns over the future 20 days defined as a raw return minus the return from the corresponding rating matching portfolio (annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is a ratio of the 
daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜   is an average value-weighted ratio of the daily number of bonds 
on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding for all bonds issued by the firm except bond i (in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns 
on bond i over the past 20 days (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average over past 20 days of a trade imbalance of bond i defined as daily difference between buy and sell trading 
volumes scaled by the total trading volume of the bond (in percent). Variables 𝑋௧௜ include the following controls: 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ ,௧௜  is defined as a sum of absolute daily returns on bond i over 
the past 20 days (annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is total daily number of bonds of issue i traded scaled by the total number of bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜ 
is the log value of total amount of bonds outstanding for bond issue i (in USD dollars); 𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  is time-to-maturity expressed in years. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses are based on the 
time series of coefficient estimates from the cross-sectional regressions using Newey–West with 20 lags. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.83  
(-5.74) 
-0.78  
(-5.42) 
-0.63  
(-5.15) 
-0.46  
(-2.45)   
-0.08  
(-1.09) 
-0.06  
(-0.90) 
-0.07  
(-0.99) 
-0.06  
(-0.93)   
-1.36  
(-6.06) 
-1.40  
(-6.05) 
-0.88  
(-5.22) 
-0.86  
(-5.16) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-1.11  
(-4.72) 
-1.19  
(-4.49)       
-0.09  
(-0.80) 
-0.05  
(-0.53)       
-1.71  
(-4.93) 
-1.61  
(-4.65) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.07  
(-4.25) 
-0.05  
(-2.85) 
-0.04  
(-2.31) 
-0.03  
(-1.48)   
-0.10  
(-7.30) 
-0.08  
(-6.76) 
-0.11  
(-9.31) 
-0.09  
(-7.96)   
-0.05  
(-2.21) 
-0.24  
(-1.29) 
-0.02  
(-0.87) 
-0.02  
(-0.71) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.04  
(-5.70)   
-0.04  
(-4.59)     
-0.03  
(-4.06)   
-0.03  
-3.93)     
-0.13  
(-3.02)   
-0.06  
(-3.15) 
Adj. R2 11.53% 11.99% 11.10% 11.71%   10.24% 9.31% 9.09% 9.06%   15.41% 16.11% 16.18% 16.85% 
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Table 4 continued. 
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.24  
(-4.14) 
-0.17  
(-2.71) 
-0.24  
(-2.51) 
0.22  
(0.59)   
-0.08  
(-2.49) 
-0.06  
(-2.07) 
-0.04  
(-1.16) 
-0.03  
(-0.94)   
-0.35  
(-2.46) 
-0.62  
(-2.52) 
-0.30  
(-2.89) 
-0.29  
(-2.87) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-0.20  
(-2.21) 
-0.48  
(-1.43)       
-0.07  
(-1.10) 
-0.07  
(-1.01)       
-0.27  
(-1.98) 
-0.26  
(-1.94) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.05  
(-1.65) 
-0.03  
(-0.93) 
0.01  
(0.17) 
0.02  
(0.50)   
-0.11  
(-5.72) 
-0.09  
(-6.88) 
-0.11  
(-9.18) 
-0.10  
(-7.41)   
-0.00  
(-0.10) 
-0.49  
(-1.03) 
0.07  
(1.56) 
0.07  
(1.68) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.02  
(-5.36)   
-0.02  
(-5.35)     
-0.02  
(-5.08)   
-0.02  
(-5.23)     
-0.11  
(-1.05)   
-0.01  
(-1.02) 
Adj. R2 8.92% 8.72% 7.98% 8.50%   9.45%l 7.79% 8.30% 8.54%   11.72% 12.23% 12.40% 12.82% 
               
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.94  
(-5.99) 
-0.91  
(-5.81) 
-0.66  
(-5.07) 
-0.65  
(-4.99)   
-0.10  
(-0.93) 
-0.08  
(-0.79) 
-0.07  
(-0.68) 
-0.07  
(-0.68)   
-1.53  
(-7.20) 
-1.42  
(-6.80) 
-0.90  
(-5.65) 
-0.86  
(-5.46) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-1.29  
(-4.93) 
-1.18  
(-4.69)       
-0.23  
(-1.43) 
-0.14  
(-0.94)       
-1.89  
(-5.09) 
-1.70  
(-4.61) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.08  
(-4.14) 
-0.06  
(-2.85) 
-0.06  
(-3.13) 
-0.04  
(-2.19)   
-0.10  
(-4.53) 
-0.08  
(-4.00) 
-0.11  
(-5.91) 
-0.09  
(-5.04)   
-0.08  
(-2.82) 
-0.08  
(-2.70) 
-0.06  
(-1.90) 
-0.06  
(-1.95) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.06  
(-4.80)   
-0.05  
(-4.39)     
-0.03  
(-2.77)   
-0.02  
(-2.63)     
-0.13  
(-4.34)   
-0.11  
(-3.33) 
Adj. R2 13.95% 14.93% 13.72% 14.49%   11.09% 10.48% 9.60% 9.31%   18.74% 19.64% 19.42% 20.43% 
                              
Panel D: Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-2.64  
(-3.14) 
-2.65  
(-3.19) 
-2.12  
(-2.90) 
-2.12  
(-2.96)   
0.04  
(0.08) 
0.02  
(0.05) 
-0.17  
(-0.37) 
-0.17  
(-0.36)   
-4.59  
(-3.70) 
-4.56  
(-3.70) 
-3.19  
(-3.01) 
-3.19  
(-3.09) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-3.95  
(-2.92) 
-4.14  
(-3.04)       
0.65  
(1.15) 
0.51  
(0.98)       
-6.61  
(-3.81) 
-6.67  
(-3.86) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.07  
(-2.11) 
-0.06  
(-1.68) 
-0.11  
(-2.89) 
-0.10  
(-2.50)   
-0.12  
(-2.29) 
-0.10  
(-1.96) 
-0.12  
(-2.13) 
-0.11  
(-1.88)   
-0.08  
(-2.19) 
-0.07  
(-1.96) 
-0.16  
(-3.51) 
-0.15  
(-3.31) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.06  
(-1.47)   
-0.00  
(-0.09)     
-0.05  
(-1.13)   
-0.05  
(-1.12)     
-0.22  
(-3.28)   
0.00  
(0.08) 
Adj. R2 8.50% 8.65% 9.07% 9.06%   8.71% 8.87% 9.50% 9.77%   11.69% 12.00% 13.24% 12.97% 
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Table 5: Do Short Sellers Predict Returns Conditional on Past Returns? Portfolio Analysis 
This table presents returns for portfolios sorted based on short interest and past bond returns. Sample for Panel A consists of 
all corporate bonds in the Markit securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and 
TRACE databases over the interval January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011, the pre-Lehman period (Panel B) consists of all 
trading days from January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period (Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to December 
30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. Bonds are double sorted every day 
into quintiles based on the daily short interest ratio and into terciles based on the abnormal returns over the past 20 days. 
After skipping 1 day, value-weighted portfolios are held for 20 trading days. This process is repeated each trading day, so 
that each trading day’s portfolio return is an average of 20 different portfolios, with 1/20 of the portfolio rebalanced each 
day. Portfolio returns are credit rating matched and are defined as the difference between raw returns (equal-weighted 
average of daily returns) and equal-weighted returns of bonds with similar credit rating, calculated as in Bessembinder et al. 
(2009). Returns are reported in percent multiplied by 252 to reflect an approximately annual return, with t-statistics based on 
the daily time series. Investment-Grade bonds are defined as those rated by Moody’s ‘Baa3’and higher five days prior to the 
sorting while the rest of the bonds are categorized as high-yield bonds. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Bonds Investment-Grade Bonds High-Yield Bonds 
ret bondt-20,t ret bondt-20,t ret bondt-20,t 
  low medium high Low medium high low medium high 
P1 7.41% (10.7) 
-1.41% 
(-2.41) 
2.54% 
(3.54)  
4.21% 
(8.18) 
-1.65% 
(-3.02) 
-0.61% 
(-1.17)  
13.12% 
(7.60) 
-4.72% 
(-2.58) 
15.13% 
(6.26) 
P2 4.51% (4.12) 
-3.44% 
(-5.10) 
-1.56% 
(-1.47)  
3.46% 
(4.61) 
-2.31% 
(-5.13) 
-1.61% 
(-2.50)  
10.1% 
(2.90) 
-9.50% 
(-3.88) 
3.00% 
(0.84) 
P3 2.87% (4.02) 
-2.58% 
(-5.53) 
-1.93% 
(-3.00)  
2.74% 
(4.55) 
-1.69% 
(-4.38) 
-1.53% 
(-3.09)  
3.91% 
(1.99) 
-8.60% 
(-4.39) 
-1.56% 
(-0.74) 
P4 2.40% (3.03) 
-2.37% 
(-4.18) 
-1.96% 
(-2.70)  
2.93% 
(3.87) 
-1.13% 
(-2.33) 
-1.68% 
(-2.81)  
1.14% 
(0.54) 
-10.1% 
(-5.84) 
-4.00% 
(-2.01) 
P5 -0.48% (-0.48) 
-3.16% 
(-4.63) 
-3.37% 
(-4.01)  
3.03% 
(4.40) 
-1.39% 
(-2.01) 
-1.81% 
(-2.52)  
-7.30% 
(-3.12) 
-13.4% 
(-6.22) 
-8.14% 
(-3.37) 
P1-P5 7.89% (6.13) 
1.75% 
(1.83) 
5.91% 
(4.89)  
1.18% 
(1.15) 
-0.26% 
(-0.27) 
1.20% 
(1.17)  
20.41% 
(6.86) 
8.69% 
(4.00) 
23.27% 
(6.51) 
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
 All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
ret bondt-20,t ret bondt-20,t ret bondt-20,t 
  low medium high low medium high Low medium high 
P1 2.67% (5.2) 
0.04% 
(0.09) 
-0.22% 
(-0.28)  
3.07% 
(6.25) 
-0.13% 
(-0.27) 
-0.76% 
(-1.49)  
1.51% 
(1.45) 
-0.76% 
(-0.58) 
0.14% 
(0.11) 
P2 1.08% (1.5) 
-1.01% 
(-2.21) 
-1.01% 
(-1.19)  
2.22% 
(3.38) 
-0.50% 
(-1.08) 
-1.51% 
(-1.56)  
0.71% 
(0.48) 
-2.77% 
(-2.69) 
-0.76% 
(-0.47) 
P3 1.11% (2.19) 
-0.76% 
(-1.89) 
-1.26% 
(-2.84)  
1.41% 
(3.08) 
-0.76% 
(-1.7) 
-2.02% 
(-4.23)  
1.76% 
(1.71) 
-1.01% 
(-1.01) 
0.3% 
(0.3) 
P4 0.91% (1.3) 
-1.01% 
(-2.03) 
-1.26% 
(-1.54)  
0.58% 
(0.51) 
-0.76% 
(-1.35) 
-2.27% 
(-3.78)  
1.18% 
(0.86) 
-1.01% 
(-0.92) 
-0.5% 
(-0.36) 
P5 -1.01% (-0.72) 
-1.76% 
(-3.3) 
-3.02% 
(-3.86)  
0.93% 
(1.27) 
-2.27% 
(-2.27) 
-3.53% 
(-4.63)  
-2.02% 
(-1.11) 
-3.28% 
(-2.66) 
-1.51% 
(-0.79) 
P1-P5 3.68% (2.35) 
1.81% 
(2.01) 
2.81% 
(1.98)  
2.14% 
(1.99) 
2.14% 
(1.74) 
2.77% 
(2.48)  
3.53% 
(1.60) 
2.52% 
(1.11) 
1.65% 
(0.67) 
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Table 5 continued 
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Bonds Investment-Grade Bonds High-Yield Bonds 
ret bondt-20,t ret bondt-20,t ret bondt-20,t 
  low medium high low medium high low medium High 
P1 10.03% (11.4) 
-1.51% 
(-1.97) 
5.90% 
(6.05)  
4.36% 
(6.15) 
-2.27% 
(-3.15) 
-0.21% 
(-0.28)  
19.05% 
(8.94) 
-3.53% 
(-1.66) 
22.65% 
(8.64) 
P2 5.87% (4.71) 
-3.53% 
(-5.25) 
-0.12% 
(-0.11)  
4.26% 
(5.25) 
-2.77% 
(-4.56) 
-1.01% 
(-1.30)  
15.4% 
(2.96) 
-9.58% 
(-3.17) 
4.46% 
(1.20) 
P3 3.45% (4.69) 
-3.28% 
(-7.19) 
-1.26% 
(-1.68)  
2.72% 
(4.95) 
-2.52% 
(-5.64) 
-1.26% 
(-2.17)  
5.32% 
(2.44) 
-11.6% 
(-6.27) 
-1.26% 
(-0.69) 
P4 3.07% (3.15) 
-2.77% 
(-3.98) 
-0.50% 
(-0.57)  
2.97% 
(3.79) 
-2.02% 
(-2.86) 
-1.26% 
(-1.31)  
4.11% 
(1.50) 
-13.1% 
(-6.96) 
-0.13% 
(-0.06) 
P5 0.66% (0.55) 
-2.77% 
(-3.16) 
-1.51% 
(-1.40)  
3.30% 
(3.21) 
-1.26% 
(-1.33) 
-0.76% 
(-0.72)  
-5.80% 
(-2.26) 
-15.62% 
(-7.11) 
-8.06% 
(-3.39) 
P1-P5 9.37% (5.68) 
1.26% 
(1.08) 
7.41% 
(4.58)  
1.06% 
(0.70) 
-1.01% 
(-0.76) 
0.55% 
(0.37)  
25.85% 
(6.84) 
12.10% 
(3.91) 
30.72% 
(8.16) 
            
Panel D: Lehman Period 
 All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
ret bondt-20,t ret bondt-20,t ret bondt-20,t 
  low medium high low medium high low Medium high 
P1 15.86% (2.79) 
-8.70% 
(-1.76) 
-3.34% 
(-0.68)  
8.99% 
(2.42) 
-5.31% 
(-1.28) 
-2.17% 
(-0.61)  
36.52% 
(2.43) 
-31.31% 
(-1.92) 
46.21% 
(2.01) 
P2 13.74% (1.36) 
-15.49% 
(-2.37) 
-12.95% 
(-1.29)  
5.09% 
(0.75) 
-8.86% 
(-2.76) 
-6.00% 
(-1.49)  
26.15% 
(0.98) 
-42.67% 
(-1.93) 
13.21% 
(0.37) 
P3 8.30% (1.21) 
-7.46% 
(-1.70) 
-9.07% 
(-1.54)  
9.45% 
(1.60) 
-1.49% 
(-0.48) 
-0.55% 
(-0.14)  
6.36% 
(0.34) 
-31.22% 
(-1.60) 
-12.20% 
(-0.56) 
P4 5.88% (0.90) 
-7.28% 
(-1.52) 
-13.41% 
(-2.70)  
14.47% 
(2.92) 
2.11% 
(0.73) 
-1.36% 
(-0.36)  
-16.52% 
(-0.92) 
-38.74% 
(-2.49) 
-44.48% 
(-2.47) 
P5 -5.02% (-0.68) 
-11.14% 
(-2.09) 
-15.98% 
(-2.52)  
11.97% 
(2.96) 
2.24% 
(0.66) 
0.49% 
(0.12)  
-41.41% 
(-1.98) 
-52.81% 
(-2.58) 
-42.03% 
(-1.81) 
P1-P5 20.88% (2.28) 
2.44% 
(0.40) 
12.64% 
(1.54)  
-2.97% 
(-0.47) 
-7.55% 
(-1.38) 
-2.65% 
(-0.45)  
77.93% 
(3.12) 
21.51% 
(1.43) 
88.23% 
(2.63) 
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Table 6: Do Short Sellers Predict Returns Conditional on Past Returns? Cross-Sectional Regressions 
This table presents Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting 20-day abnormal returns by short interest interacted with past bond 
returns. Each day we estimate the following cross-sectional predictive regression: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଶ,௧ାଶଵ௜ = 𝛼ଵ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ + 𝛼ଶ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ × 𝐷௧
௛௜௚௛ + 𝛼ଷ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ × 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪ + 𝛼ସ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛
+ 𝛼ହ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪ + 𝛼଺௧𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ ,௧௜ + 𝛾௧𝑋௧௜ + 𝑢௧௜ . 
We average then each coefficient over time-series dimension. The sample consists of all corporate bonds in Markit’s 
securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases from January 1, 
2006 to December 30, 2011. Bonds with Moody’s credit rating of ‘Baa-3’ and higher five days prior to the sorting are 
categorized as Investment-Grade Bonds; others are categorized as High-Yield Bonds. Pre-Lehman period (Panel B) consists 
of all trading days from  January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period (Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to 
December 30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. Dependent variable is a 
simple average of abnormal bond returns over the future 20 days defined as a raw return minus the return from the 
corresponding rating matching portfolio (annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is a ratio of the daily number of 
bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple 
average over past 20 days of a trade imbalance of bond i defined as daily difference between buy and sell trading volumes 
scaled by the total trading volume of the bond (in percent). To define 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  variables, we sort 
bonds on day t into terciles based on 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ ,  where 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns on bond 
i over the past 20 days (in percent). 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛ = 1 if the bond abnormal return over the past 20 trading days falls into 
the highest tercile and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛ = 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪ = 1 if the bond abnormal return over the 
past 20 trading days falls into the lowest tercile and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪ = 0 otherwise. Control variables 𝑋௧௜ include; 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is defined as a sum of absolute daily returns on bond i over the past 20 days (annualized and expressed in 
percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is total daily number of bonds of issue i traded scaled by the total number of bonds outstanding (in 
percent); 𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜ is the log value of total amount of bonds outstanding for bond issue i (in USD dollars); 𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  is time-to-
maturity expressed in years. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses are based on the time series of coefficient estimates 
from the cross-sectional regressions using Newey–West with 20 lags. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Bonds  Investment Grade  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  -0.43 (-2.81) -0.36 (-1.80)  -0.01 (-0.21) 0.01 (0.16)   -1.70 (-6.12) -1.63 (-6.07) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  -8.68 (-7.53) -8.12 (-7.32)  -2.42 (-4.31) -1.59 (-3.07)   -9.85 (-5.94) -8.85 (-5.81) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  0.15 (0.13) -0.39 (-0.34)  3.81 (5.25) 3.93 (5.85)  5.21 (3.27) 4.79 (3.11) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    -0.05 (-5.33)    -0.03 (-4.73)     -0.11 (-4.78) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  
-0.02 (-0.01) -0.12 (-0.57)  0.03 (0.53) -0.01 (-0.04)   0.79 (3.63) 0.75 (3.63) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  
-0.66 (-4.59) -0.64 (-4.45)  -0.14 (-2.48) -0.14 (-2.65)   -0.37 (-3.33) -0.36 (-3.20) 
Adj. R2 9.24% 9.78%  7.82% 7.51%   11.57% 12.28% 
                 
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment Grade  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  0.13 (0.40) 0.28 (0.60)  -0.06 (-1.44) -0.05 (-1.32)   -0.42 (-3.76) -0.43 (-3.80) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  -4.13 (-3.83) -3.57 (-3.57)  -2.05 (-3.28) -1.17 (-2.65)   -3.39 (-2.59) -3.48 (-2.65) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  -0.21 (-0.26) -0.62 (-0.70)  1.64 (3.14) 1.95 (5.19)  0.82 (0.86) 0.49 (0.50) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    -0.02 (-4.50)    -0.03 (-5.57)     -0.01 (-0.97) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  
-0.30 (-0.92) -0.48 (-0.95)  -0.07 (-1.01) -0.06 (-0.97)   0.08 (1.01) 0.10 (1.11) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  
-0.08 (-1.49) -0.06 (-1.23)  0.01 (0.28) 0.03 (0.90)   -0.18 (-1.91) -0.15 (-1.62) 
Adj. R2 6.12% 6.24%  7.35% 6.70%   7.70% 8.07% 
  
40 
 
Table 6 continued. 
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment Grade  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  -0.72 (-5.79) -0.71 (-5.77)  0.05 (0.56) 0.07 (0.89)   -1.97 (-7.03) -1.86 (-6.64) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  -10.22 (-9.22) -9.78 (-9.40)  -2.31 (-3.12) -1.46 (-2.26)   -12.64 (-6.64) -11.33 (-6.10) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  -0.46 (-0.33) -1.11 (-0.85)  4.49 (4.78) 4.60 (5.31)  7.74 (2.97) 7.20 (2.83) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    -0.07 (-4.34)    -0.03 (-3.03)     -0.16 (-4.42) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  
0.37 (4.33) 0.34 (4.22)  0.04 (0.47) -0.02 (-0.29)   1.36 (5.53) 1.32 (5.55) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  
-0.73 (-4.53) -0.69 (-4.47)  -0.27 (-3.03) -0.28 (-3.12)   -0.47 (-2.57) -0.47 (-2.63) 
Adj. R2 11.73% 12.64%  8.33% 8.15%   14.53% 15.56% 
                 
Panel D: Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment Grade  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  -1.13 (-2.44) -1.04 (-2.43)  -0.16 (-0.31) -0.09 (-0.18)   -5.43 (-3.42) -5.33 (-3.58) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  -18.79 (-2.33) -17.44 (-2.23)  -4.56 (-1.34) -4.11 (-1.11)   -20.71 (-1.81) -16.98 (-1.66) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  5.17 (0.57) 4.71 (0.52)  8.95 (1.91) 8.29 (1.81)  8.88 (1.38) 8.87 (1.55) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    -0.08 (-2.00)    -0.08 (-1.88)     -0.27 (-3.22) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  
-1.05 (-2.50) -1.23 (-2.78)  0.43 (1.19) 0.35 (1.01)   0.47 (0.29) 0.24 (0.15) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  
-2.66 (-3.18) -2.74 (-3.28)  0.02 (0.10) -0.08 (-0.42)   -0.64 (-1.38) -0.62 (-1.15) 
Adj. R2 7.88% 8.10%  6.85% 7.16%   10.60% 10.91% 
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Table 7: Summary Statistics: Stocks Variable 
All variables are as defined in Table I. The variables are computed for all stocks in CRSP database that have also corporate bonds in the FISD and TRACE databases and the data in the Markit 
securities lending database from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011. Daily statistics are first computed by security and descriptive statistics of those security averages are reported below. 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  is a ratio of the daily number of shares of stock i on loan (shorted) on day t to a number of shares outstanding (in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  of firm i is an average value-weighted 
ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) to the number of bonds outstanding for all bonds issued by the firm on day t (in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  is annualized stock abnormal return on 
day t defined as a raw return minus the return from the corresponding size and book-to-market ratio matching portfolio (in percent); ); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is annualized bond abnormal return on day t 
defined as a raw return minus the return from the corresponding credit rating matching portfolio (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  is stock i trade imbalance defined as daily difference between buy and 
sell trading volumes scaled by the total trading volume of the stock (in percent); 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠௧௜ is defined as absolute value of stock i abnormal return on day t (annualized and expressed in 
percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  is total daily shares of stock i traded scaled on day t by the total number of shares outstanding (in percent); 𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜ is the market capitalization of firm i (in USD dollars); 
𝑏𝑚௧௜  is the book-to-market ratio of firm i; 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ is defined as the sum of long-term and short-term debts divided by stockholders total equity of the firm issuing bond i; 𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜ 
institutional holding is defined as the number of shares held by institutional investors as recorded in 13F filings and are scaled by the total number of shares outstanding of the firm issuing bond 
i (in percent). Panel A reports mean and standard deviation for Large stocks (largest quintile in terms of market capitalization) and Small stocks (smallest quintile) for the pre-Lehman (from 
January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008) and post-Lehman (from January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011) periods. Panels B and C report correlations among variables for large and small stocks 
respectively. Correlations are computed cross-sectionally every day and then averaged across time. Standard errors for correlations are autocorrelation adjusted using Newey–West with 20 lags. 
Panel A: Averages and Standard Deviations 
 
Large Stocks Small Stocks 
Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman Pre-Lehman Post-Lehman 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  2.15% 0.55% 1.52% 0.30% 10.36% 2.11% 5.69% 1.25% 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  3.35% 0.36% 1.26% 0.23% 3.04% 0.75% 1.33% 0.48% 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  6.33% 8.19% 5.92% 9.95% -15.62% 26.96% 9.32% 56.95% 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  1.41% 4.33% -0.76% 11.24% -2.52% 11.19% -7.81% 28.98% 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  1.19% 2.86% -0.24% 1.64% 0.05% 6.23% -1.77% 4.42% 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠௧௜ 8.77% 6.00% 20.36% 26.21% 36.29% 24.72% 79.38% 71.57% 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  0.85% 0.27% 1.11% 0.32% 1.15% 0.28% 1.10% 0.35% 
𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜ (USD Billions) 49.72 6.24 38.89 4.77 0.36  0.06  0.29  0.09  
𝑏𝑚௧௜  0.42 0.02 0.55 0.07 1.02 0.27 1.63 0.70 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ 1.15 0.12 1.05 0.17  1.43 0.19 1.92 0.35 
𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜  72.76% 2.61% 73.63% 0.73%  70.14% 1.59% 66.61% 2.26% 
number of stocks 288  467 
total number of stocks 1,401 
total number of bonds with traded stocks 5,291 
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Table 7 continued. 
Panel B: Correlations (Large Stocks) 
 
ret stockst-20,t ret bondt-20,t short stockt short firmt oib stockt-20,t volatility stockt-20,t turnover stockt-20,t 
ret stockst+2,t+21 -0.003 -0.010 -0.038*** -0.005 0.008* -0.021 -0.011 
ret stockst-20,t 1 0.222*** 0.054*** -0.005 -0.004 0.048** -0.010 
ret bondt-20,t  1 0.035* 0.022 0.010** -0.014 -0.017 
short stockt   1 0.011 0.018*** 0.175*** 0.297*** 
short firmt     1 -0.003 0.006 0.023*** 
oib stockt-20,t     1 0.006 0.024*** 
volatility stockt-20,t      1 0.497*** 
 
Panel C: Correlations (Small Stocks) 
 
ret stockst-20,t ret bondt-20,t short stockt short firmt oib stockt-20,t volatility stockt-20,t turnover stockt-20,t 
ret stockst+2,t+21 0.020 0.009 -0.028 0.003 0.001 0.037 0.013 
ret stockst-20,t 1 0.383*** -0.045** -0.000 0.033*** 0.154*** -0.027 
ret bondt-20,t  1 -0.028 -0.001 0.016*** 0.019 -0.022 
short stockt   1 0.118*** -0.000 0.154*** 0.392*** 
short firmt     1 0.011 0.073*** 0.084*** 
oib stockt-20,t    1 -0.003 0.025*** 
volatility stockt-20,t          1 0.374*** 
 
 
 
43 
 
Table 8: Bond Short Selling versus Stock Short Selling: Cross-Sectional Bond Return Regressions 
This table presents Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting 20-day abnormal returns. Each day we estimate the following cross-sectional predictive regression: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଶ,௧ାଶ௜ = 𝛼଴௧ + 𝛼ଵ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ + 𝛼ଶ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ + 𝛼ଷ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜ + 𝛼ସ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛼ହ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛼଺௧𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛾௧𝑋௧௜ + 𝑢௧௜ . 
We average then each coefficient over time-series dimension. The sample consists of all corporate bonds that have the corresponding stock traded and have entries in the Markit securities 
lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011. Bonds with Moody’s credit rating of ‘Baa-3’ and 
higher five days prior to the sorting are categorized as Investment-Grade Bonds; others are categorized as High-Yield Bonds. Pre-Lehman period (Panel B) consists of all trading days from  
January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period (Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 
2008. Dependent variable is a simple average of abnormal bond returns over the future 20 days defined as a raw return minus the return from the corresponding rating matching portfolio 
(annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is a ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding (in percent); 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜   is an average value-weighted ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding for all bonds issued by the firm 
except bond i (in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜ is a ratio of the daily number of shares on loan (shorted) for stock corresponding to bond issue i on day t to a number of shares outstanding (in percent); 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns on bond i over the past 20 days (in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns on stock corresponding to bond 
issue i over the past 20 days (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average over past 20 days of a trade imbalance of bond i defined as daily difference between buy and sell trading volumes 
scaled by the total trading volume of the bond (in percent). Control variables 𝑋௧௜ include: 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is defined as a sum of absolute daily returns on bond i over the past 20 days 
(annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is total daily number of bonds of issue i traded scaled by the total number of bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜ is the log value 
of total amount of bonds outstanding for bond issue i (in USD dollars); 𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  is time-to-maturity expressed in years; 𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜ is the log value of market capitalization of the firm issuing bond i (in 
USD dollars); 𝑏𝑚௧௜  is book-to-market ratio of the firm issuing bond i; 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ is defined as the sum of long-term and short-term debts divided by stockholders total equity of the firm issuing 
bond i; 𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜ institutional holding is defined as the number of shares held by institutional investors as recorded in 13F filings and are scaled by the total number of shares outstanding of the 
firm issuing bond i (in percent). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses are based on the time series of coefficient estimates from the cross-sectional regressions using Newey–West with 20 
lags. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.43  
(-2.89) 
-0.45  
(-2.91) 
-0.35  
(-2.60) 
-0.34  
(-2.53)  
0.04  
(0.46) 
0.05  
(0.55) 
-0.01  
(-0.11) 
0.01  
(0.03)  
-0.53  
(-2.56) 
-0.55  
(-2.62) 
-0.47  
(-2.34) 
-0.49  
(-2.44) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-0.56  
(-2.56) 
-0.57  
(-2.58)      
0.23  
(1.54) 
0.21  
(1.44)      
-0.67  
(-2.42) 
-0.66  
(-2.40) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  
-0.41  
(-3.22) 
-0.43 
(-3.09) 
-0.30  
(-3.16) 
-0.30  
(-3.10)  
0.01  
(0.08) 
0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.06  
(-0.52) 
-0.07  
(-0.58)  
-0.79  
(-2.10) 
-0.77  
(-2.06) 
-0.36  
(-2.89) 
-0.34  
(-2.77) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.07  
(-7.38) 
-0.07  
(-7.20) 
-0.09  
(-7.24) 
-0.09  
(-7.02)  
-0.11  
(-9.34) 
-0.11  
(-9.01) 
-0.12  
(-10.6) 
-0.12  
(-10.3)  
-0.05  
(-3.71) 
-0.05  
(-3.66) 
-0.07  
(-4.21) 
-0.07  
(-4.11) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
7.30  
(9.87) 
7.25  
(9.84) 
7.31  
(10.3) 
7.22  
(10.2)  
6.49  
(9.29) 
6.37  
(9.09) 
6.44  
(9.39) 
6.28  
(9.16)  
8.25  
(9.04) 
8.33  
(9.14) 
8.30  
(7.93) 
8.37  
(9.95) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.01  
(-2.76)   
-0.01  
(-1.51)    
-0.02  
(-3.95)   
-0.02  
(-3.80)    
-0.01  
(-0.53)   
0.01  
(0.92) 
Adj. R2 11.80% 12.00% 12.53% 12.76%  15.16% 15.45% 15.25% 15.53%  15.93% 16.10% 18.30% 18.55% 
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Table 8 continued 
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.18  
(-2.63) 
-0.23  
(-1.92) 
-0.12  
(-2.89) 
-0.11  
(-2.68)  
0.07  
(0.51) 
0.08  
(0.63) 
-0.03  
(-0.86) 
-0.02  
(-0.48)  
-0.24  
(-2.40) 
-0.24 
(-2.44) 
-0.20  
(-2.47) 
-0.20  
(-2.54) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-0.21  
(-2.26) 
-0.22  
(-2.34)      
-0.09  
(-1.00) 
-0.10  
(-1.11)      
-0.26  
(-2.16) 
-0.26  
(-2.24) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  
-0.30  
(-1.59) 
-0.37  
(-1.56) 
-0.16  
(-1.12) 
-0.16  
(-1.18)  
-0.03  
(-0.14) 
-0.04  
(-0.16) 
-0.21  
(-1.40) 
-0.22  
(-1.42)  
-1.08  
(-1.19) 
-1.09  
(-1.20) 
-0.12  
(-0.82) 
-0.12  
(-0.85) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.07  
(-4.83) 
-0.07  
(-4.72) 
-0.08  
(-4.30) 
-0.07  
(-4.11)  
-0.12  
(-8.07) 
-0.11  
(-7.77) 
-0.13  
(-8.31) 
-0.13  
(-7.99)  
-0.04  
(-2.28) 
-0.05  
(-2.28) 
-0.04  
(-1.38) 
-0.04  
(-1.33) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
7.10  
(7.60) 
7.10  
(7.62) 
6.16  
(6.39) 
6.10  
(6.32)  
5.77  
(6.20) 
5.68  
(6.01) 
5.50  
(5.71) 
5.39  
(5.50)  
7.84  
(7.56) 
7.96  
(7.66) 
6.53  
(5.50) 
6.62  
(5.42) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.02  
(-3.27)   
-0.02  
(-4.07)    
-0.03  
(-4.86)   
-0.03  
(-4.96)    
0.01  
(0.61)   
0.01  
(0.73) 
Adj. R2 8.71% 8.92% 10.37% 10.63%  12.78% 13.13% 13.64% 14.00%  11.34% 11.49% 14.93% 15.17% 
               
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.48  
(-2.33) 
-0.49  
(-2.37) 
-0.43  
(-2.33) 
-0.44  
(-2.38)  
-0.09  
(-0.87) 
-0.10  
(-0.94) 
-0.09  
(-0.89) 
-0.10  
(-0.95)  
-0.35  
(-1.76) 
-0.37  
(-1.88) 
-0.34  
(-1.69) 
-0.37  
(-1.85) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-0.44  
(-1.48) 
-0.44  
(-1.47)      
0.31  
(1.25) 
0.30  
(1.24)      
-0.54  
(-1.28) 
-0.54  
(-1.27) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  
-0.31  
(-2.02) 
-0.30  
(-1.90) 
-0.28  
(-2.26) 
-0.27  
(-2.13)  
0.13  
(0.72) 
0.12  
(0.67) 
0.14  
(0.83) 
0.13  
(0.76)  
-0.35  
(-1.74) 
-0.32  
(-1.55) 
-0.39  
(-2.33) 
-0.36  
(-2.12) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.07  
(-4.95) 
-0.07  
(-4.89) 
-0.08  
(-5.51) 
-0.08  
(-5.44)  
-0.10  
(-5.51) 
-0.10  
(-5.38) 
-0.11  
(-6.78) 
-0.11  
(-6.60)  
-0.07  
(-3.38) 
-0.07  
(-3.33) 
-0.09  
(-4.10) 
-0.09  
(-4.10) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
6.46  
(6.18) 
6.40  
(6.12) 
7.07  
(7.75) 
6.99  
(7.59)  
6.07  
(6.51) 
5.94  
(6.29) 
6.24  
(7.18) 
6.09  
(6.87)  
8.67  
(6.03) 
8.69  
(6.05) 
8.60  
(5.36) 
8.68  
(5.41) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.01  
(-0.43)   
0.01  
(0.31)    
-0.01 
(-1.55)   
-0.01  
(-1.57)    
0.01  
(0.31)   
0.02  
(1.12) 
Adj. R2 13.31% 13.50% 13.41% 13.61%  16.49% 16.73% 15.96% 16.16%  18.56% 18.72% 20.54% 20.78% 
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Table 8 continued 
Panel D: Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-1.23  
(-1.30) 
-1.17  
(-1.76) 
-0.81  
(-0.94) 
-0.74 
(-0.84)  
0.71  
(1.30) 
0.79  
(1.76) 
0.56  
(0.99) 
0.65  
(1.20)  
-2.84  
(-1.85) 
-2.88  
(-0.63) 
-2.31  
(-1.56) 
-2.39  
(-1.58) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-2.72  
(-2.04) 
-2.72  
(-2.06)      
1.10  
(2.07) 
1.00  
(2.00)      
-3.17  
(-2.16) 
-3.04  
(-2.11) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  
-1.44  
(-2.59) 
-1.44  
(-2.59) 
-1.06  
(-2.81) 
-1.02  
(-2.89)  
-0.46  
(-0.92) 
-0.48  
(-0.92) 
-0.56  
(-1.23) 
-0.55  
(-1.20)  
-2.09  
(-2.58) 
-2.05  
(-2.69) 
-1.20  
(-1.88) 
-1.15  
(-1.91) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.10  
(-3.00) 
-0.09  
(-2.71) 
-0.15  
(-2.56) 
-0.14  
(-2.38)  
-0.13  
(-3.33) 
-0.12  
(-3.10) 
-0.14  
(-3.01) 
-0.13  
(-2.80)  
0.02  
(0.39) 
0.02  
(0.50) 
-0.11  
(-1.63) 
-0.10  
(-1.50) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
12.96  
(4.96) 
12.78  
(4.98) 
13.55  
(4.75) 
13.21  
(4.75)  
11.94  
(4.21) 
11.72  
(4.32) 
11.49  
(3.78) 
11.08  
(3.86)  
7.55  
(2.35) 
7.86  
(2.46) 
13.87  
(3.99) 
14.24  
(4.10) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.05  
(-2.74)   
-0.02  
(-0.46)    
-0.05  
(-1.64)   
-0.04  
(-1.41)    
-0.11 
(-2.61)   
-0.03  
(-0.50) 
Adj. R2 15.95% 16.20% 16.46% 16.75%  17.35% 17.70% 17.84% 18.20%  19.84% 20.15% 19.49% 19.75% 
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Table 9: Do Bond Short Sellers Have Information about Stock Returns? Cross-Sectional Regressions 
This table presents Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting 20-day stock abnormal returns. Each day we estimate the following cross-sectional predictive regression: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ାଶ,௧ାଶଵ௜ = 𝛼଴௧ + 𝛼ଵ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ + 𝛼ଶ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜ + 𝛼ଷ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛼ସ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼ହ௧𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛾௧𝑋௧௜ + 𝑢௧௜ . 
We average then each coefficient over time-series dimension. The sample consists of all corporate bonds that have the corresponding stock traded and have entries in the Markit securities 
lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011. Stocks that are in the upper market capitalization 
quintile across the sample five days prior to the sorting are categorized as Large stocks; stocks that are in the lowest market capitalization quintile are categorized as Small stocks. Pre-Lehman 
period (Panel B) consists of all trading days from  January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period (Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011 and the Lehman period 
(Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. Dependent variable is a simple average of abnormal stock returns over the future 20 days defined as a raw return minus the return from the 
corresponding size and book-to-market matching portfolio (annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜   is an average value-weighted ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan 
(shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding for all bonds issued by the firm except bond i (in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  is a ratio of the daily number of shares on loan 
(shorted) for stock corresponding to bond issue i on day t to a number of shares outstanding (in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns on bond i over the past 20 days 
(in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns on stock corresponding to bond issue i over the past 20 days (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average over past 20 
days of a trade imbalance of stock i defined as daily difference between buy and sell trading volumes scaled by the total trading volume of the stock (in percent). Control variables 𝑋௧௜ include: 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is defined as a sum of absolute daily returns on stock i over the past 20 days (annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is total daily value of bonds of stock i 
traded scaled by the total number of shares outstanding (in percent); 𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜ is the log value of market capitalization of the firm i (in USD dollars); 𝑏𝑚௧௜  is book-to-market ratio; 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ is 
defined as the sum of long-term and short-term debts divided by stockholders total equity; 𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜ institutional holding is defined as the number of shares held by institutional investors as 
recorded in 13F filings and are scaled by the total number of shares outstanding (in percent). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses are based on the time series of coefficient estimates from 
the cross-sectional regressions using Newey–West with 20 lags. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Stocks  Small Stocks  Large Stocks 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  
0.24  
(0.45) 
0.10  
(0.20) 
0.25  
(0.49) 
0.29  
(0.60) 
 
-0.37  
(-0.16) 
-0.63  
(-0.28) 
-0.46  
(-0.19) 
-0.80  
(-0.35) 
 
0.03  
(0.06) 
-0.02  
(-0.04) 
0.09  
(0.17) 
0.23  
(0.43) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜      
-0.75  
(-2.21) 
-0.79  
(-2.29) 
 
    0.12  (0.18) 
0.16  
(0.24) 
 
    -1.41  (-2.53) 
-1.44  
(-2.93) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.01  
(0.56) 
0.01  
(0.94) 
0.01  
(0.84) 
0.01  
(0.82) 
 
0.02  
(0.73) 
0.03  
(1.36) 
0.02  
(0.96) 
0.03  
(1.27) 
 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.10) 
0.00  
(0.17) 
0.00  
(0.03) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.01  
(-0.11) 
-0.01  
(-0.18) 
-0.01  
(-0.12) 
-0.01  
(-0.15) 
 
-0.01  
(-0.10) 
-0.03  
(-0.26) 
-0.05  
(-0.45) 
-0.06  
(-0.56) 
 
-0.01  
(-0.33) 
-0.01  
(-0.46) 
0.00  
(0.06) 
-0.00  
(-0.08) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.09  
(-0.34)   
-0.13  
(-0.49) 
 
  0.22  (0.26)   
0.53  
(0.66) 
 
  0.56  (1.74)   
0.51  
(1.59) 
Adj. R2 7.13% 7.33% 7.66% 7.87% 
 
13.84% 14.86% 15.12% 15.79% 
 
8.68% 8.85% 9.32% 9.51% 
  
47 
 
Table 9 continued. 
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
All Stocks  Small Stocks  Large Stocks 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  
-0.04  
(-0.05) 
-0.18  
(-0.20) 
-0.11  
(-0.13) 
-0.24  
(-0.29) 
 
-0.39  
(-0.09) 
-1.13  
(-0.27) 
-0.45  
(-0.10) 
-1.33  
(-0.31) 
 
-0.51  
(-0.57) 
-0.50  
(-0.56) 
-0.50  
(-0.56) 
-0.48  
(-0.54) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜      
-0.29  
(-0.66) 
-0.26  
(-0.60) 
 
    0.38  (0.38) 
0.43  
(0.46) 
 
    -1.25  (-2.50) 
-1.22  
(-2.43) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.02  
(-1.64) 
-0.02  
(-1.27) 
-0.02  
(-1.43) 
-0.02  
(-1.25) 
 
-0.02  
(-0.62) 
0.02  
(0.54) 
-0.01  
(-0.20) 
0.01  
(0.42) 
 
-0.02  
(-1.50) 
-0.02  
(-1.55) 
-0.02  
(-1.26) 
-0.02  
(-1.31) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.01  
(0.43) 
0.01  
(0.33) 
0.01  
(0.44) 
0.01  
(0.36) 
 
-0.08  
(-0.49) 
-0.06  
(-0.37) 
-0.11  
(-0.67) 
-0.09  
(-0.54) 
 
0.04  
(1.07) 
0.04  
(1.05) 
0.04  
(1.19) 
0.04  
(1.16) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.30  
(-0.71)   
-0.30  
(-0.74) 
 
  -1.56  (-1.36)   
-1.21  
(-1.11) 
 
  0.73  (1.65)   
0.66  
(1.49) 
Adj. R2 6.67% 6.91% 7.13% 7.37% 
 
11.66% 12.62% 12.40% 12.92% 
 
8.33% 8.33% 8.67% 8.71% 
               
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Stocks  Small Stocks  Large Stocks 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  
0.47  
(1.37) 
0.27  
(0.65) 
0.39  
(1.14) 
0.68  
(1.81) 
 
-0.01  
(-0.01) 
0.14  
(0.12) 
-0.35  
(-0.27) 
-0.21  
(-0.17) 
 
0.38  
(1.44) 
0.18  
(0.52) 
0.30  
(1.13) 
0.59  
(1.83) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜      
-0.75  
(-2.29) 
-0.93  
(-2.44) 
 
    -0.04  (-0.02) 
0.12  
(0.07) 
 
    -1.16  (-1.89) 
-1.26  
(-1.93) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.03  
(1.72) 
0.04  
(1.98) 
0.04  
(1.91) 
0.03  
(1.73) 
 
0.07  
(1.76) 
0.06  
(1.60) 
0.07  
(1.76) 
0.06  
(1.63) 
 
0.01  
(0.41) 
0.02  
(0.56) 
0.01  
(0.49) 
0.01  
(0.31) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.01  
(0.30) 
0.01  
(0.30) 
0.01  
(0.40) 
0.01  
(0.42) 
 
0.12  
(0.97) 
0.06  
(0.49) 
0.06  
(0.51) 
0.01  
(0.11) 
 
-0.07  
(-1.52) 
-0.08  
(-1.72) 
-0.05  
(-1.18) 
-0.06  
(-1.38) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
0.17 
(0.64)   
0.08  
(0.29) 
 
  2.66  (2.35)   
2.78  
(2.60) 
 
  0.34  (0.80)   
0.26  
(0.60) 
Adj. R2 6.34% 6.49% 6.77% 6.96% 
 
16.09% 17.25% 18.44% 19.37% 
 
7.81% 8.30% 8.50% 8.99% 
                            
Panel D: Lehman Period 
All Stocks  Small Stocks  Large Stocks 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  
0.89  
(0.51) 
0.99  
(0.59) 
1.69  
(1.11) 
1.75  
(1.18) 
 
-1.77  
(-0.52) 
-0.96  
(-0.28) 
-0.94  
(-0.29) 
-0.27  
(-0.08) 
 
1.67  
(0.68) 
1.83  
(0.76) 
2.63  
(1.25) 
2.81  
(1.36) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜      
-3.68  
(-1.68) 
-3.20  
(-1.64) 
 
    -2.68  (-1.03) 
-2.26  
(-0.93) 
 
    -3.32  (-0.99) 
-3.33  
(-0.99) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.04  
(0.71) 
0.04  
(0.71) 
0.04  
(0.86) 
0.04  
(0.85) 
 
-0.01  
(-0.10) 
-0.01  
(-0.15) 
-0.00  
(-0.03) 
-0.01  
(-0.14) 
 
0.07  
(0.90) 
0.07  
(0.92) 
0.07  
(1.02) 
0.07  
(1.05) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.13  
(-1.53) 
-0.13  
(-1.51) 
-0.15  
(-1.65) 
-0.15  
(-1.63) 
 
-0.12  
(-0.37) 
-0.17  
(-0.56) 
-0.11  
(-0.33) 
-0.15  
(-0.47) 
 
-0.01  
(-0.18) 
-0.01  
(-0.18) 
0.00  
(0.05) 
0.01  
(0.06) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.03  
(-0.03)   
-0.06  
(-0.05) 
 
  0.38  (0.11)   
1.27  
(0.36) 
 
  0.41  (0.32)   
0.60  
(0.48) 
Adj. R2 13.33% 13.41% 14.60% 14.67% 
 
17.27% 18.10% 17.19% 17.60% 
 
14.53% 14.30% 16.70% 16.47% 
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Table 10: Substitution effect in short selling around the short sale ban 
This table presents a diff-in-diff analysis of the difference in short bond and stock interest, the difference in net new short 
interest of bonds and stocks, and the difference in bond and stock lending fees around stock short sale ban. The sample 
consists of all corporate bonds that have the corresponding stock traded, have entries in the Markit securities lending 
database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases from August 1, 2008 to October 7, 
2008. We further merge this sample with a list of firms which stocks were banned from short selling short sale ban period 
between September 19, 2008 and October 7, 2008. Our final sample consists of 117 banned firms and 824 non-banned firms. 
Specifically we estimate the following regression: 
𝑌௧௜ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑏𝑎𝑛௧ + 𝛼ଶ𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡௜ + 𝛼ଷ𝑏𝑎𝑛௧ × 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡௜ + 𝑢௧௜ , 
where 𝑌௧௜ corresponds to one of the following three variables: 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡௧௜ = 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ − 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜ is the difference 
between stock and bond shorting for firm i and day t; 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡௧௜ = ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ − ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  is the difference 
between net new short interest;  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑒𝑒௧௜ = 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ − 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜ . We define 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  as an 
average value-weighted ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds 
outstanding for all bonds issued by the firm except bond i (in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  is a ratio of the daily number of shares 
on loan (shorted) for stock corresponding to bond issue i on day t to a number of shares outstanding (in percent); net new 
short interest ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  and ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  are defined as the first differences in short interest scaled by daily total 
trading volumes in bonds and stocks respectively;  𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  is defined as the interest rate on cash funds minus 
the rebate rate for borrowing stock i (in basis points); 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑒𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  is an average value-weighted ratio of the bond 
lending fees for each bond issued by the firm i on day t (in basis points); 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡௜ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
corresponding stock of firm i was banned from short selling by SEC between September 19, 2008 and October 7, 2008 and 
zero otherwise; 𝑏𝑎𝑛௧ is a dummy variable equals to 1 if t is between September 19, 2008 and October 7, 2008 and zero 
otherwise. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
  𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡௧௜   𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 ∆𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡௧௜   𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑒𝑒௧௜ 
𝑏𝑎𝑛௧ 0.007 (0.06) 0.046 (4.71) 16.252 (2.90) 
𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡௜ 0.173 (0.79) -0.016 (-1.14) 29.413 (3.56) 
𝑏𝑎𝑛௧  × 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡௜ 0.792 (2.46) 0.080 (3.01) 70.931 (4.70) 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 -5.847 (-91.8)   0.002 (0.46)   -30.352 (-9.82) 
Adj. R2 0.03%   0.14%   0.49% 
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Table 11: Predicting Bond Short Interest: Cross-Sectional Regressions 
This table presents Fama-MacBeth regressions of predicting 5-day bond short interest. Each day we estimate the following 
cross-sectional regression: 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଶ,௧ା଺௜ = 𝛼଴௧ + 𝛼ଵ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛ + 𝛼ଶ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪ + 𝛼ଷ௧𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜ + 𝛼ସ௧𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜
+ 𝛼ହ௧𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜ + 𝛼଺௧𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜ + 𝛼଻௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜ + 𝛼଼௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜ + 𝑢௧௜ . 
We average then each coefficient over time-series dimension. The sample consists of all corporate bonds in the Markit 
securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases and the issuer’s 
stock from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011. Bonds with Moody’s credit rating of ‘Baa-3’ and higher five days prior to 
the sorting are categorized as Investment-Grade Bonds; others are categorized as High-Yield Bonds. Pre-Lehman period 
(Panel B) consists of all trading days from  January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period (Panel C) is from 
January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. 
Dependent variable 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଶ,௧ା଺௜  is a simple average of bond short interest over the future 5 days defined a ratio of the 
daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding (expressed in percent). 
To define 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛  and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪  variables, we sort bonds on day t into terciles based on 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜ ,  where 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns on bond i over the past 5 days (in percent). 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛ = 1 if the 
bond abnormal return over the past 5 trading days falls into the highest tercile and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛ = 0 otherwise. Similarly, 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪ = 1 if the bond abnormal return over the past 5 trading days falls into the lowest tercile and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,ହ௟௢௪ =
0 otherwise; 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜  is simple average over the past 5 days of an average value-weighted ratio of the daily number 
of bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding for all bonds issued by the firm 
except bond i (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  is a simple average over past and future 5 days of a trade imbalance of bond i 
defined as daily difference between buy and sell trading volumes scaled by the total trading volume of the bond (in percent); 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  is defined as a sum of absolute daily returns on bond i over the past and future 5 days respectively (daily 
and expressed in percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  is total daily number of bonds of issue i traded scaled by the total number of 
bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜ is the log value of total amount of bonds outstanding for bond issue i (in USD 
dollars). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses are based on the time series of coefficient estimates from the cross-
sectional regressions using Newey–West with 20 lags. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 All Bonds Investment-Grade Bonds High-Yield Bonds 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛  0.023 (5.78) 0.024 (5.79) 0.017 (2.52) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪  0.020 (4.72) 0.013 (2.77) 0.027 (4.03) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.244 (39.4) 0.216 (32.0) 0.347 (38.0) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  -0.320 (-0.65) 0.654 (1.12) -1.304 (-1.49) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  1.133 (2.84) 0.993 (2.46) 3.539 (3.26) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  1.241 (4.24) 1.437 (4.14) 1.655 (3.77) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.960 (211.4) 0.957 (175.2) 0.962 (232.2) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜  0.011 (7.51) 0.009 (4.69) 0.009 (4.13) 
Adj. R2 91.61% 90.82% 92.95% 
    
Panel B: Pre-Lehman 
 All Bonds Investment-Grade Bonds High-Yield Bonds 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛  0.013 (1.80) 0.013 (1.92) 0.004 (0.35) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪  0.031 (4.17) 0.025 (3.09) 0.043 (3.67) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.227 (29.83) 0.187 (21.3) 0.369 (31.6) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  -0.627 (-0.56) 0.762 (0.60) -2.118 (-1.05) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  1.523 (3.45) 1.176 (3.29) 4.747 (2.79) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  0.264 (0.50) 0.128 (0.23) 1.254 (1.42) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.980 (201.6) 0.982 (192.6) 0.977 (185.3) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜  0.007 (0.16) 0.005 (2.17) 0.007 (3.54) 
Adj. R2 93.29% 93.32% 93.27% 
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Table 10 continued. 
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
 All Bonds Investment-Grade Bonds High Yield Bonds 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛  0.031 (7.67) 0.033 (7.93) 0.031 (4.29) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪  0.010 (3.37) 0.003 (0.93) 0.020 (2.58) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.269 (34.9) 0.249 (30.9) 0.343 (27.3) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.116 (0.56) 0.701 (1.61) -0.148 (-0.77) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  1.145 (1.68) 1.258 (1.75) 3.695 (2.46) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  1.587 (6.18) 1.818 (5.80) 2.089 (5.20) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.953 (218.8) 0.949 (166.9) 0.956 (194.5) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜  0.015 (6.65) 0.014 (6.01) 0.011 (2.71) 
Adj. R2 90.72% 89.66% 92.54% 
     
Panel D: Lehman Period 
 All Bonds Investment-Grade Bonds High Yield Bonds 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛  0.029 (1.68) 0.022 (1.07) -0.004 (-0.20) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪  0.023 (0.96) 0.004 (0.19) -0.006 (-0.25) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.182 (11.1) 0.174 (12.6) 0.262 (8.40) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  -1.312 (-2.93) -0.146 (-0.45) -3.943 (-3.58) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  -0.857 (-0.92) -1.430 (-1.38) -3.31 (-1.40) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  4.061 (5.79) 5.688 (5.20) 1.135 (0.88) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.895 (38.4) 0.876 (32.3) 0.927 (44.6) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜  0.010 (2.19) -0.006 (-0.74) 0.012 (1.43) 
Adj. R2 88.47% 85.22% 93.72% 
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Figure 1: Sample Size 
Plot of number of bonds lent against calendar years. Bonds in the sample include all corporate bonds in the Markit securities 
lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases. 
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Figure 2: Short Interest  
Plot of short interest (𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ ) defined as value-weights average of ratios of the number of bonds on loan (shorted) to 
the number of bonds outstanding (in percent) against calendar date. The sample consists of all corporate bonds in the Markit 
securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases from January 1, 
2006 to December 30, 2011. Bonds with Moody’s credit rating of ‘Baa-3’ and higher five days prior to the sorting are 
categorized as Investment-Grade Bonds; others are categorized as High-Yield Bonds. 
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Figure 3: Costs: Lending Fees and Realized Spreads 
This figure plots lending fees (Panel A plots means and Panel B plots medians) and realized spread (Panel C) against 
calendar date for Investment and High-Yield bonds. Lending fee is average value-weighted (with respect to the loan 
quantity) lending fee is defined as the interest rate on cash funds minus the rebate rate (annualized and in basis points); 
realized spread is defined as daily average buy price minus sell price of the bond scaled by the mid-price of the two last buy 
and sell transactions (in percent). The sample consists of all corporate bonds in the Markit securities lending database for 
which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011. 
Bonds with Moody’s credit rating of ‘Baa-3’ and higher five days prior to the sorting are categorized as Investment-Grade 
Bonds; others are categorized as High-Yield Bonds. 
Panel A: Lending Fees: Means 
 
Panel B: Lending Fees: Medians 
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Panel C: Realized Spreads 
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Figure 4: Risk-adjusted daily returns on Short Selling positions 
The Figure plots cumulative abnormal returns for portfolio of bonds sorted based on the short interest. The sample consists 
of all corporate bonds in the Markit securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and 
TRACE databases from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011. Bonds are sorted into quintiles based on the estimated short 
interest ratio over the previous 5 trading days. After skipping 1 day, value-weighted portfolios are held for 20 trading days. 
This process is repeated each trading day, so that each trading day’s portfolio abnormal return (defined as a difference 
between raw return and the corresponding credit rating matched portfolio return) is an average of 20 different portfolios, 
with 1/20 of the portfolio rebalanced each day. Daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of the least and 
most shorted portfolios are plotted. Panel A plots returns for portfolios of all bonds in the same, results in Panel B 
corresponds to Investment-Grade bonds and Panel C contains results for High-Yield bonds. Bonds with Moody’s credit 
rating of ‘Baa-3’ and higher five days prior to the sorting are categorized as Investment-Grade Bonds; others are categorized 
as High-Yield Bonds. 
Panel A: All Bonds 
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Panel C: High-Yield Bonds 
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Figure 5: Short Interest: Bonds vs Stocks  
Plot of short interest for bonds and stocks matched sample. 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  defined as value-weights average of ratios of the 
number of bonds on loan (shorted) to the number of bonds outstanding (in percent) against calendar date; 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜ 
defined as value-weights average of ratios of the number of shares shorted to the number of shares outstanding (in percent) 
against calendar date. The sample consists of all corporate bonds in the Markit securities lending database for which 
corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases and corresponding stock data in CRSP from January 1, 
2006 to December 30, 2011. Panel A plots short interest for all bonds and stocks in matched sample, Panel B plots short 
interest for small stocks and Panel C for large stocks. Small stocks correspond to the smallest quintile of market size while 
large stocks are in the largest size quintile. 
Panel A: Full matched sample of bonds and stocks 
 
Panel B: Matched sample of small stocks 
 
Panel C: Matched sample of large stocks 
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Figure 6: Bonds vs Stocks costs: Lending fees and realized spreads 
This figure plots lending fees (Panel A plots means and Panel B plots medians) and realized spread (Panel C) against 
calendar date for bonds and stocks. Lending fee is average value-weighted (with respect to the loan quantity) lending fee is 
defined as the interest rate on cash funds minus the rebate rate (annualized and in basis points); realized spread is defined as 
daily average buy price minus sell price scaled by the mid-price of the two last buy and sell transactions (in basis points). 
The sample consists of all corporate bonds in the Markit securities lending database for which corresponding data is 
available in the FISD and TRACE databases and the corresponding stock data in CRSP from January 1, 2006 to December 
30, 2011. 
Panel A: Lending Fees: Means 
 
Panel B: Lending Fees: Medians 
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Table IA1: Portfolio Returns and Short Interest: Without Large Reversals 
This table presents returns for portfolios sorted based on short interest. We consider all corporate bonds in the Markit 
securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases. To mitigate the 
concern that the obtained results are driven by large returns that are due to data errors, we drop observations where a 
particular daily bond absolute return is in excess of 10% and promptly reverses during the following trading day to anywhere 
between 90% and 110% of its original value. Every day we sort bonds by their trading volume and retain the two upper 
terciles of the most heavily traded one. Full Sample (Panel A) consists of all trading days from January 1, 2006 to December 
30, 2011, the pre-Lehman period (Panel B) consists of all trading days from January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-
Lehman period (Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) is from June 1, 
2008 to December 30, 2008. Bonds are sorted every day into quintiles based on the daily short interest ratio. After skipping 1 
day, value-weighted portfolios are held for 20 trading days. This process is repeated each trading day, so that each trading 
day’s portfolio return is an average of 20 different portfolios, with 1/20 of the portfolio rebalanced each day. Portfolio 
returns are credit rating matched and are defined as the difference between raw returns (the equal-weighted average of daily 
returns) and issue-size equal-weighted returns of bonds with similar credit rating, calculated as in Bessembinder et al. 
(2009). Returns are reported in percent multiplied by 252 to reflect an approximately annual return, with t-statistics based on 
the daily time series. Investment-grade bonds are defined as those rated by Moody’s ‘Baa3’and higher five days prior to the 
sorting while the rest of the bonds are categorized as high-yield bonds. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 3.06% (6.74)   0.70% (1.66)  9.40% (7.93) 
P2 -0.22% (-0.27)   -0.50% (-1.02) 4.20% (1.38) 
P3 -0.31% (-0.59)   -0.11% (-0.30) -0.41% (-0.23) 
P4 -0.31% (-0.54)   0.13% (0.26) -1.55% (-0.88) 
P5 (Most) -1.94% (-2.69)   0.08% (0.14)   -8.30% (-3.84) 
P1-P5 5.01% (5.18)  0.63% (0.69)  17.70% (7.32) 
                
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 0.66% (1.63)   0.73% (1.71) 0.43% (0.51) 
P2 -0.25% (-0.54)   -0.22% (-0.40) -0.76% (-0.68) 
P3 -0.20% (-0.54)   -0.24% (-0.69) 0.35% (0.47) 
P4 -0.19% (-0.37)   -0.25% (-0.53) 0.58% (0.61) 
P5 (Most) -1.51% (-2.00)   -1.01% (-1.79)   -2.02% (-1.21) 
 2.17% (2.08)  1.74% (1.89)  2.44% (1.14) 
                
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 5.27% (8.03)   0.96% (1.59) 16.68% (9.91) 
P2 0.25% (0.31)   -0.50% (-0.72) 7.16% (1.75) 
P3 -0.25% (-0.52)   -0.50% (-1.11) 0.68% (0.41) 
P4 -0.16% (-0.22)   -0.50% (-0.69) 0.35% (0.19) 
P5 (Most) -1.51% (-1.58)   0.21% (0.24)   -7.31% (-3.27) 
P1-P5 6.78% (4.89)  0.75% (0.55)  23.99% (7.82) 
                
Panel D: Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 2.13% (0.68)   -0.99% (-0.35) 11.85% (1.33) 
P2 -2.38% (-0.32)   -2.44% (-0.61) 12.14% (0.46) 
P3 -1.08% (-0.22)   2.51% (0.77) -10.57% (-0.58) 
P4 -1.81% (-0.38)   5.61% (1.66) -23.33% (-1.39) 
P5 (Most) -7.50% (-1.31)   5.25% (1.67)   -45.19% (-2.24) 
P1-P5 9.63% (1.47)  -6.24% (-1.15)  57.05% (2.97) 
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Table IA2: Portfolio Returns and Short Interest: Heavily Traded Bonds 
This table presents returns for portfolios sorted based on short interest. We consider all corporate bonds in the Markit 
securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases. Every day we sort 
bonds by their trading volume and retain the two upper terciles of the most heavily traded one. Full Sample (Panel A) 
consists of all trading days from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011, the pre-Lehman period (Panel B) consists of all 
trading days from January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period (Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to December 
30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. Bonds are sorted every day into 
quintiles based on the daily short interest ratio. After skipping 1 day, value-weighted portfolios are held for 20 trading days. 
This process is repeated each trading day, so that each trading day’s portfolio return is an average of 20 different portfolios, 
with 1/20 of the portfolio rebalanced each day. Portfolio returns are credit rating matched and are defined as the difference 
between raw returns (the equal-weighted average of daily returns) and issue-size equal-weighted returns of bonds with 
similar credit rating, calculated as in Bessembinder et al. (2009). Returns are reported in percent multiplied by 252 to reflect 
an approximately annual return, with t-statistics based on the daily time series. Investment-grade bonds are defined as those 
rated by Moody’s ‘Baa3’and higher five days prior to the sorting while the rest of the bonds are categorized as high-yield 
bonds. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 8.08% (7.16)   0.47% (0.62)  25.25% (7.42) 
P2 1.54% (2.60)   -1.44% (-2.79) 13.33% (6.43) 
P3 0.46% (0.88)   -1.37% (-3.61) 6.65% (3.42) 
P4 0.23% (0.37)   -1.52% (-2.52) 3.46% (1.59) 
P5 (Most) -4.85% (-4.79)   -1.83% (-2.63)   -13.89% (-4.84) 
P1-P5 12.92% (8.01)  2.30% (2.12)  39.14% (8.66) 
                
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 0.55% (0.94)   1.03% (2.01) -1.01% (-0.73) 
P2 -0.21% (-0.49)   -0.01% (-0.02) -0.50% (-0.34) 
P3 -0.25% (-0.46)   0.01% (0.02) -0.50% (-0.46) 
P4 -0.76% (-0.99)   -0.25% (-0.43) -1.01% (-0.65) 
P5 (Most) -2.02% (-2.13)   -1.26% (-1.36)   -3.78% (-1.73) 
 2.57% (2.21)  2.29% (1.94)  2.77% (0.99) 
                
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 11.19% (9.90)   2.62% (3.74) 31.50% (10.24) 
P2 0.55% (0.81)   -0.76% (-1.61) 5.59% (2.25) 
P3 -0.76% (-1.20)   -0.76% (-1.15) 0.45% (0.23) 
P4 0.07% (0.08)   -0.24% (-0.29) -0.06% (-0.03) 
P5 (Most) -2.27% (-1.99)   -0.16% (-0.16)   -7.81% (-3.01) 
P1-P5 13.46% (8.25)  2.78% (1.98)  39.31% (9.67) 
                
Panel D: Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds High Yield Bonds 
P1 (Least) 14.94% (2.45)   0.93% (0.24) 50.91% (2.86) 
P2 1.33% (0.23)   2.58% (0.56) 1.60% (0.08) 
P3 -0.97% (-0.16)   4.41% (0.89) -16.73% (-0.99) 
P4 -3.99% (-0.68)   5.14% (1.28) -34.28% (-1.78) 
P5 (Most) -11.49% (-1.64)   4.37% (1.04)   -53.99% (-2.51) 
P1-P5 26.43% (2.92)  -3.45% (-0.57)  104.89% (3.48) 
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Table IA3: Cross-Sectional Return Regressions 
This table presents Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting 20-day abnormal returns. Each day we estimate the following cross-sectional predictive regression: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଶ,௧ାଶଵ௜ = 𝛼ଵ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ + 𝛼ଶ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ + 𝛼ଷ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛼ସ௧𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛾௧ 𝑋௧௜ + 𝑢௧௜ . 
We average then each coefficient over time-series dimension. The sample consists of all corporate bonds in the Markit securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in 
the FISD and TRACE databases from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011. Bonds with Moody’s credit rating of ‘Baa-3’ and higher five days prior to the sorting are categorized as 
Investment-Grade Bonds; others are categorized as High-Yield Bonds. Pre-Lehman period (Panel B) consists of all trading days from  January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period 
(Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. Dependent variable is a simple average of abnormal bond 
returns over the future 20 days defined as a raw return minus the return from the corresponding rating matching portfolio (annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is a ratio of the 
daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜   is an average value-weighted ratio of the daily number of bonds 
on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding for all bonds issued by the firm except bond i (in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns 
on bond i over the past 20 days (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average over past 20 days of a trade imbalance of bond i defined as daily difference between buy and sell trading 
volumes scaled by the total trading volume of the bond (in percent). Control variables 𝑋௧௜ include: 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is defined as a sum of absolute daily returns on bond i over the past 20 days 
(annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is total daily number of bonds of issue i traded scaled by the total number of bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜ is the log value 
of total amount of bonds outstanding for bond issue i (in USD dollars); 𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  is time-to-maturity expressed in years. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses are based on the time series of 
coefficient estimates from the cross-sectional regressions using Newey–West with 20 lags. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.83  
(-5.74) 
-0.78  
(-5.42) 
-0.63  
(-5.15) 
-0.46  
(-2.45)   
-0.08  
(-1.09) 
-0.06  
(-0.90) 
-0.07  
(-0.99) 
-0.06  
(-0.93)   
-1.36  
(-6.06) 
-1.40  
(-6.05) 
-0.88  
(-5.22) 
-0.86  
(-5.16) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-1.11  
(-4.72) 
-1.19  
(-4.49)       
-0.09  
(-0.80) 
-0.05  
(-0.53)       
-1.71  
(-4.93) 
-1.61  
(-4.65) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.07  
(-4.25) 
-0.05  
(-2.85) 
-0.04  
(-2.31) 
-0.03  
(-1.48)   
-0.10  
(-7.30) 
-0.08  
(-6.76) 
-0.11  
(-9.31) 
-0.09  
(-7.96)   
-0.05  
(-2.21) 
-0.24  
(-1.29) 
-0.02  
(-0.87) 
-0.02  
(-0.71) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.04  
(-5.70)   
-0.04  
(-4.59)     
-0.03  
(-4.06)   
-0.03  
(-3.93)     
-0.13  
(-3.02)   
-0.06  
(-3.15) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.11  
(8.84) 
0.11  
(8.36) 
0.09  
(6.91) 
0.09  
(6.86)   
0.05  
(5.63) 
0.03  
(4.56) 
0.04  
(4.76) 
0.03  
(4.44)   
0.12  
(6.25) 
0.35  
(1.64) 
0.12  
(7.00) 
0.12  
(7.14) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.09  
(0.99) 
0.54  
(2.37) 
0.08  
(0.95) 
0.54  
(2.55)   
-0.03  
(-0.91) 
0.25  
(2.04) 
-0.02  
(-0.66) 
0.27  
(2.33)   
-0.30  
(-0.16) 
-0.44  
(-0.22) 
0.13  
(0.07) 
0.58  
(0.27) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  
-0.61  
(-1.26) 
-0.36  
(-0.66) 
-0.45  
(-0.90) 
-0.23  
(-0.43)   
-0.77  
(-2.38) 
-0.87  
(-2.10) 
-0.70  
(-2.35) 
-0.87  
(-2.33)   
-4.64  
(-2.15) 
-5.46  
(-2.63) 
-3.85  
(-1.78) 
-4.41  
(-2.17) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  
-0.10  
(-1.05) 
-0.08  
(-0.82) 
-0.07  
(-0.78) 
-0.07  
(-0.76)   
0.04  
(0.40) 
0.08  
(0.88) 
0.08  
(0.86) 
0.10  
(1.02)   
-0.15  
(-1.02) 
-0.13  
(-0.93) 
-0.19  
(-1.25) 
-0.17  
(-1.14) 
intercept -8.47  (-1.57) 
-11.7  
(-1.77) 
-6.88  
(-1.25) 
-9.94  
(-1.56)   
2.81  
(0.73) 
4.99  
(0.99) 
2.88  
(0.80) 
5.17  
(1.13)   
28.5  
(1.17) 
9.23  
(0.25) 
21.1  
(0.85) 
27.2  
(1.16) 
Adj. R2 11.53% 11.99% 11.10% 11.71%   10.24% 9.31% 9.09% 9.06%   15.41% 16.11% 16.18% 16.85% 
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Table IA3 continued 
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.24  
(-4.14) 
-0.17  
(-2.71) 
-0.24  
(-2.51) 
0.22  
(0.59)   
-0.08  
(-2.49) 
-0.06  
(-2.07) 
-0.04  
(-1.16) 
-0.03  
(-0.94)   
-0.35  
(-2.46) 
-0.62  
(-2.52) 
-0.30  
(-2.89) 
-0.29  
(-2.87) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-0.20  
(-2.21) 
-0.48  
(-1.43)       
-0.07  
(-1.10) 
-0.07  
(-1.01)       
-0.27  
(-1.98) 
-0.26  
(-1.94) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.05  
(-1.65) 
-0.03  
(-0.93) 
0.01  
(0.17) 
0.02  
(0.50)   
-0.11  
(-5.72) 
-0.09  
(-6.88) 
-0.11  
(-9.18) 
-0.10  
(-7.41)   
-0.00  
(-0.10) 
-0.49  
(-1.03) 
0.07  
(1.56) 
0.07  
(1.68) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.02  
(-5.36)   
-0.02  
(-5.35)     
-0.02  
(-5.08)   
-0.02  
(-5.23)     
-0.11  
(-1.05)   
-0.01  
(-1.02) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.07  
(4.14) 
0.06  
(3.62) 
0.04  
(2.33) 
0.04  
(2.34)   
0.04  
(3.40) 
0.02  
(3.13) 
0.02  
(3.17) 
0.02  
(3.18)   
0.05  
(1.18) 
0.63  
(1.14) 
0.06  
(2.07) 
0.06  
(2.16) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.17  
(1.61) 
0.22  
(0.76) 
0.12  
(1.56) 
0.16  
(0.58)   
0.03  
(0.80) 
0.12  
(0.99) 
0.03  
(0.79) 
0.13  
(1.19)   
0.71  
(0.71) 
-0.13  
(-0.11) 
-0.10  
(-0.09) 
-1.30  
(-0.91) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  
0.04  
(0.11) 
0.23  
(0.48) 
0.20  
(0.61) 
0.42  
(1.02)   
-0.46  
(-1.79) 
-0.16  
(-0.48) 
-0.41  
(-1.74) 
-0.22  
(-0.71)   
1.32  
(1.44) 
0.60  
(0.67) 
1.61  
(1.57) 
0.90  
(1.00) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  
-0.17  
(-1.76) 
-0.14  
(-1.50) 
-0.13  
(-1.44) 
-0.14  
(-1.53)   
-0.13  
(-1.35) 
-0.09  
(-1.05) 
-0.10  
(-1.14) 
-0.09  
(-1.09)   
-0.03  
(-0.24) 
-0.01  
(-0.09) 
-0.09  
(-0.57) 
-0.05  
(-0.32) 
intercept -4.83  (-1.00) 
-7.16  
(-1.03) 
-4.07  
(-0.88) 
-6.97  
(-1.18)   
4.69  
(1.27) 
1.52  
(0.33) 
5.10  
(1.43) 
2.49  
(0.56)   
-21.62  
(-1.72) 
-88.7  
(-1.22) 
-25.2  
(-1.98) 
-16.3  
(-1.42) 
Adj. R2 8.92% 8.72% 7.98% 8.50%   9.45% 7.79% 8.30% 8.54%   11.72% 12.23% 12.40% 12.82% 
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Table IA3 continued 
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.94  
(-5.99) 
-0.91  
(-5.81) 
-0.66  
(-5.07) 
-0.65  
(-4.99)   
-0.10  
(-0.93) 
-0.08  
(-0.79) 
-0.07  
(-0.68) 
-0.07  
(-0.68)   
-1.53  
(-7.20) 
-1.42  
(-6.80) 
-0.90  
(-5.65) 
-0.86  
(-5.46) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-1.29  
(-4.93) 
-1.18  
(-4.69)       
-0.23  
(-1.43) 
-0.14  
(-0.94)       
-1.89  
(-5.09) 
-1.70  
(-4.61) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.08  
(-4.14) 
-0.06  
(-2.85) 
-0.06  
(-3.13) 
-0.04  
(-2.19)   
-0.10  
(-4.53) 
-0.08  
(-4.00) 
-0.11  
(-5.91) 
-0.09  
(-5.04)   
-0.08  
(-2.82) 
-0.08  
(-2.70) 
-0.06  
(-1.90) 
-0.06  
(-1.95) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.06  
(-4.80)   
-0.05  
(-4.39)     
-0.03  
(-2.77)   
-0.02  
(-2.63)     
-0.13  
(-4.34)   
-0.11  
(-3.33) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.15  
(8.51) 
0.14  
(8.20) 
0.14  
(8.32) 
0.13  
(8.03)   
0.06  
(5.52) 
0.05  
(4.64) 
0.05  
(5.05) 
0.04  
(4.48)   
0.18  
(8.65) 
0.18  
(8.71) 
0.18  
(8.66) 
0.18  
(8.78) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.04  
(0.87) 
0.84  
(2.98) 
0.04  
(1.07) 
0.84  
(3.21)   
-0.03  
(-0.96) 
0.47  
(2.44) 
-0.04  
(-1.19) 
0.43  
(2.26)   
1.26  
(0.59) 
1.73  
(0.67) 
2.26  
(0.89) 
4.20  
(1.41) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  
-0.53  
(-0.82) 
-0.16  
(-0.20) 
-0.45  
(-0.74) 
-0.15  
(-0.20)   
-0.99  
(-2.26) 
-1.36  
(-2.58) 
-0.82  
(-2.11) 
-1.16  
(-2.62)   
-3.94  
(-2.09) 
-4.18  
(-2.08) 
-3.50  
(-1.84) 
-3.51  
(-1.78) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  
-0.05  
(-0.49) 
-0.04  
(-0.36) 
-0.04  
(-0.40) 
-0.04  
(-0.35)   
0.20  
(1.83) 
0.25  
(2.36) 
0.26  
(2.46) 
0.28  
(2.69)   
-0.15  
(-0.72) 
-0.14  
(-0.68) 
-0.16  
(-0.80) 
-0.16  
(-0.78) 
intercept -15.29  (-2.04) 
-20.3  
(-2.11) 
-13.6 
(-2.00) 
-18.0  
(-2.1)   
1.66  
(0.34) 
7.54  
(1.22) 
0.59  
(0.13) 
5.34  
(1.01)   
9.38  
(0.42) 
11.4  
(0.47) 
5.52  
(0.24) 
3.75  
(0.16) 
Adj. R2 13.95% 14.93% 13.72% 14.49%   11.09% 10.48% 9.60% 9.31%   18.74% 19.64% 19.42% 20.43% 
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Table IA3 continued 
Panel D: Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-2.64  
(-3.14) 
-2.65  
(-3.19) 
-2.12  
(-2.90) 
-2.12  
(-2.96)   
0.04  
(0.08) 
0.02  
(0.05) 
-0.17  
(-0.37) 
-0.17  
(-0.36)   
-4.59  
(-3.70) 
-4.56  
(-3.70) 
-3.19  
(-3.01) 
-3.19  
(-3.09) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-3.95  
(-2.92) 
-4.14  
(-3.04)       
0.65  
(1.15) 
0.51  
(0.98)       
-6.61  
(-3.81) 
-6.67  
(-3.86) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.07  
(-2.11) 
-0.06  
(-1.68) 
-0.11  
(-2.89) 
-0.10  
(-2.50)   
-0.12  
(-2.29) 
-0.10  
(-1.96) 
-0.12  
(-2.13) 
-0.11  
(-1.88)   
-0.08  
(-2.19) 
-0.07  
(-1.96) 
-0.16  
(-3.51) 
-0.15  
(-3.31) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.06  
(-1.47)   
-0.00  
(-0.09)     
-0.05  
(-1.13)   
-0.05  
(-1.12)     
-0.22  
(-3.28)   
0.00  
(0.08) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.09  
(2.06) 
0.09  
(2.17) 
0.05  
(0.93) 
0.05  
(1.01)   
0.02  
(0.40) 
0.02  
(0.36) 
0.02  
(0.38) 
0.02  
(0.38)   
0.14  
(3.15) 
0.14  
(3.30) 
0.08  
(1.37) 
0.09  
(1.49) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.09  
(0.10) 
0.12  
(0.09) 
0.12  
(0.15) 
0.44  
(0.35)   
-0.25  
(-0.94) 
-0.49  
(-1.27) 
-0.16  
(-0.53) 
-0.07  
(-0.18)   
-13.38  
(-0.94) 
-14.17  
(-1.05) 
-11.12  
(-0.79) 
-12.35  
(-0.89) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  
-3.78  
(-1.20) 
-3.99  
(-1.49) 
-3.13  
(-0.84) 
-3.39  
(-1.00)   
-0.80  
(-0.38) 
-1.01  
(-0.36) 
-1.22  
(-0.60) 
-1.84  
(-0.69)   
-33.44  
(-2.09) 
-37.98  
(-3.01) 
-28.59  
(-1.64) 
-31.62  
(-2.22) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  
-0.05  
(-0.07) 
-0.01  
(-0.02) 
0.03  
(0.05) 
0.06  
(0.09)   
-0.21  
(-0.30) 
-0.16  
(-0.24) 
-0.20  
(-0.29) 
-0.16  
(-0.23)   
-0.65  
(-0.73) 
-0.61  
(-0.69) 
-0.84  
(-0.82) 
-0.80  
(-0.82) 
intercept 15.6  (0.49) 
18.5  
(0.58) 
20.0  
(0.52) 
23.8  
(0.62)   
1.59  
(0.06) 
4.76  
(0.13) 
7.00  
(0.28) 
15.3  
(0.46)   
346.8  
(1.91) 
403.7  
(2.92) 
303.0  
(1.52) 
341.9  
(2.14) 
Adj. R2 8.50% 8.65% 9.07% 9.06%   8.71% 8.87% 9.50% 9.77%   11.69% 12.00% 13.24% 12.97% 
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Table IA4: How Do Short Sellers React to Past Returns? Cross-Sectional Regressions 
This table presents Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting 20-day abnormal returns by short interest interacted with past bond 
returns. Each day we estimate the following cross-sectional predictive regression: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଶ,௧ାଶ௜ = 𝛼ଵ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ + 𝛼ଶ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ × 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ ,௧
௛௜௚௛ + 𝛼ଷ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ × 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪
+ 𝛼ସ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛ + 𝛼ହ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪ + 𝛼଺௧𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛾௧ 𝑋௧௜ + 𝑢௧௜ . 
We average then each coefficient over time-series dimension. The sample consists of all corporate bonds in Markit’s 
securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases from January 1, 
2006 to December 30, 2011. Bonds with Moody’s credit rating of ‘Baa-3’ and higher five days prior to the sorting are 
categorized as Investment-Grade Bonds; others are categorized as High-Yield Bonds. Pre-Lehman period (Panel B) consists 
of all trading days from  January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period (Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to 
December 30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. Dependent variable is a 
simple average of abnormal bond returns over the future 20 days defined as a raw return minus the return from the 
corresponding rating matching portfolio (annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is a ratio of the daily number of 
bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ ,௧௜  is a simple 
average of abnormal returns on bond i over the past 20 days (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average over past 20 
days of a trade imbalance of bond i defined as daily difference between buy and sell trading volumes scaled by the total 
trading volume of the bond (in percent). To define 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚  and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ ,௧௟௢௪  variables, we sort bonds on day t into 
terciles based on 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ , where 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns on bond i over the past 20 
days (in percent). 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛ = 1 if the bond abnormal return over the past 20 trading days falls into the highest tercile 
and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛ = 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪ = 1 if the bond abnormal return over the past 20 trading days 
falls into the lowest tercile and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪ = 0 otherwise. Control variables 𝑋௧௜ include: 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is defined as a 
sum of absolute daily returns on bond i over the past 20 days (annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is total 
daily number of bonds of issue i traded scaled by the total number of bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜ is the log 
value of total amount of bonds outstanding for bond issue i (in USD dollars); 𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  is time-to-maturity expressed in years. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses are based on the time series of coefficient estimates from the cross-sectional 
regressions using Newey–West with 20 lags. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Bonds  IG Bonds  HY Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  -0.43 (-2.81) -0.36 (-1.80)  -0.01 (-0.21) 0.01 (0.16)   -1.70 (-6.12) -1.63 (-6.07) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  -8.68 (-7.53) -8.12 (-7.32)  -2.42 (-4.31) -1.59 (-3.07)   -9.85 (-5.94) -8.85 (-5.81) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  0.15 (0.13) -0.39 (-0.34)  3.81 (5.25) 3.93 (5.85)  5.21 (3.27) 4.79 (3.11) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    -0.05 (-5.33)    -0.03 (-4.73)     -0.11 (-4.78) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  -0.02 (-0.01) -0.12 (-0.57)  0.03 (0.53) -0.01 (-0.04) 
  0.79 (3.63) 0.75 (3.63) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  
-0.66 (-4.59) -0.64 (-4.45)  -0.14 (-2.48) -0.14 (-2.65)   -0.37 (-3.33) -0.36 (-3.20) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  0.10 (8.68) 0.10 (8.59)  0.04 (4.91) 0.03 (4.04)   0.12 (8.75) 0.12 (9.11) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  0.07 (0.65) 0.43 (2.00)  -0.02 (-0.64) 0.21 (1.76)   -1.16 (-0.61) -1.33 (-0.67) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  -0.31 (-0.68) -0.01 (-0.02)  -0.61 (-2.05) -0.73 (-1.91)   -3.28 (-1.58) -4.06 (-2.09) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  -0.06 (-0.67) -0.05 (-0.54)  0.05 (0.52) 0.09 (0.98)   -0.07 (-0.47) -0.05 (-0.32) intercept -7.50 (-1.46) -11.84 (-1.86)  0.65 (0.18) 2.70 (0.56)   17.53 (0.74) 25.83 (1.16) 
Adj. R2 9.24% 9.78%  7.82% 7.51%   11.57% 12.28% 
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Table IA4 continued 
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  IG Bonds  HY Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  0.13 (0.40) 0.28 (0.60)  -0.06 (-1.44) -0.05 (-1.32)   -0.42 (-3.76) -0.43 (-3.80) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  -4.13 (-3.83) -3.57 (-3.57)  -2.05 (-3.28) -1.17 (-2.65)   -3.39 (-2.59) -3.48 (-2.65) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  -0.21 (-0.26) -0.62 (-0.70)  1.64 (3.14) 1.95 (5.19)  0.82 (0.86) 0.49 (0.50) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    -0.02 (-4.50)    -0.03 (-5.57)     -0.01 (-0.97) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  -0.30 (-0.92) -0.48 (-0.95)  -0.07 (-1.01) -0.06 (-0.97)   0.08 (1.01) 0.10 (1.11) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  
-0.08 (-1.49) -0.06 (-1.23)  0.01 (0.28) 0.03 (0.90)   -0.18 (-1.91) -0.15 (-1.62) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  0.06 (3.62) 0.06 (3.34)  0.03 (2.83) 0.02 (2.51)   0.07 (3.09) 0.08 (3.33) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  0.14 (1.45) 0.28 (1.00)  0.01 (0.14) 0.08 (0.63)   0.75 (0.74) -0.07 (-0.06) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  0.10 (0.29) 0.55 (1.17)  -0.42 (-1.66) -0.15 (-0.46)   1.56 (1.71) 0.84 (0.96) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  -0.16 (-1.68) -0.14 (-1.49)  -0.13 (-1.35) -0.08 (-0.98)   -0.03 (-0.23) 0.00 (0.04) intercept -3.87 (-0.77) -3.87 (-0.77)  4.28 (1.11) 4.28 (1.11)   -26.93 (-2.32) -26.93 (-2.32) 
Adj. R2 6.12% 6.24%  7.35% 6.70%   7.70% 8.07% 
 
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  IG Bonds  HY Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  -0.72 (-5.79) -0.71 (-5.77)  0.05 (0.56) 0.07 (0.89)   -1.97 (-7.03) -1.86 (-6.64) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  -10.22 (-9.22) -9.78 (-9.40)  -2.31 (-3.12) -1.46 (-2.26)   -12.64 (-6.64) -11.33 (-6.10) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  -0.46 (-0.33) -1.11 (-0.85)  4.49 (4.78) 4.60 (5.31)  7.74 (2.97) 7.20 (2.83) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    -0.07 (-4.34)    -0.03 (-3.03)     -0.16 (-4.42) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  0.37 (4.33) 0.34 (4.22)  0.04 (0.47) -0.02 (-0.29)   1.36 (5.53) 1.32 (5.55) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  
-0.73 (-4.53) -0.69 (-4.47)  -0.27 (-3.03) -0.28 (-3.12)   -0.47 (-2.57) -0.47 (-2.63) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  0.13 (8.56) 0.13 (8.73)  0.05 (4.27) 0.04 (3.57)   0.15 (9.29) 0.15 (9.56) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  -0.00 (-0.12) 0.57 (2.42)  -0.04 (-1.25) 0.35 (1.86)   -0.26 (-0.12) 0.02 (0.01) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  -0.15 (-0.24) 0.08 (0.11)  -0.71 (-1.77) -1.11 (-2.28)   -1.82 (-1.15) -2.21 (-1.27) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  0.02 (0.24) 0.04 (0.26)  0.21 (1.98) 0.25 (2.40)   0.02 (0.12) 0.04 (0.19) intercept -13.11 (-1.81) -16.71 (-1.77)  -1.56 (-0.34) 4.15 (0.71)   -5.73 (-0.30) -2.93 (-0.14) 
Adj. R2 11.73% 12.64%  8.33% 8.15%   14.53% 15.58% 
         
Panel D: Lehman Period 
All Bonds  IG Bonds  HY Bonds 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  -1.13 (-2.44) -1.04 (-2.43)  -0.16 (-0.31) -0.09 (-0.18)   -5.43 (-3.42) -5.33 (-3.58) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  -18.79 (-2.33) -17.44 (-2.23)  -4.56 (-1.34) -4.11 (-1.11)   -20.71 (-1.81) -16.98 (-1.66) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  5.17 (0.57) 4.71 (0.52)  8.95 (1.91) 8.29 (1.81)  8.88 (1.38) 8.87 (1.55) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    -0.08 (-2.00)    -0.08 (-1.88)     -0.27 (-3.22) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧
௛௜௚௛  -1.05 (-2.50) -1.23 (-2.78)  0.43 (1.19) 0.35 (1.01)   0.47 (0.29) 0.24 (0.15) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜
× 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௟௢௪  
-2.66 (-3.18) -2.74 (-3.28)  0.02 (0.10) -0.08 (-0.42)   -0.64 (-1.38) -0.62 (-1.15) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  0.09 (2.41) 0.10 (2.60)  0.03 (0.75) 0.03 (0.79)   0.14 (3.43) 0.14 (3.61) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  0.15 (0.15) 0.30 (0.20)  -0.04 (-0.13) -0.09 (-0.22)   -14.27 (-0.97) -14.29 (-1.04) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  -2.97 (-0.95) -2.89 (-1.09)  -0.80 (-0.42) -0.99 (-0.38)   -31.73 (-1.97) -35.02 (-2.82) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  -0.13 (-0.20) -0.10 (-0.16)  -0.17 (-0.27) -0.14 (-0.22)   -0.76 (-0.89) -0.74 (-0.87) intercept 9.56 (0.33) 7.44 (0.25)  -1.74 (-0.08) 0.83 (0.02)   335.7 (1.81) 373.2 (2.73) 
Adj. R2 7.88% 8.10%  6.85% 7.16%   10.60% 10.91% 
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Table IA5: Bond Short Selling versus Stock Short Selling: Cross-Sectional Regressions 
This table presents Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting 20-day abnormal returns. Each day we estimate the following cross-sectional predictive regression: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଶ,௧ାଶଵ௜ = 𝛼ଵ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜ + 𝛼ଶ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ + 𝛼ଷ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜ + 𝛼ସ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛼ହ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼଺௧𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛾௧ 𝑋௧௜ + 𝑢௧௜ . 
We average then each coefficient over time-series dimension. The sample consists of all corporate bonds that have the corresponding stock traded, have entries in the Markit securities lending 
database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011. Bonds with Moody’s credit rating of ‘Baa-3’ and higher five 
days prior to the sorting are categorized as Investment-Grade Bonds; others are categorized as High-Yield Bonds. Pre-Lehman period (Panel B) consists of all trading days from  January 1, 2006 
to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period (Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. Dependent 
variable is a simple average of abnormal bond returns over the future 20 days defined as a raw return minus the return from the corresponding rating matching portfolio (annualized and 
expressed in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  is a ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜   is an 
average value-weighted ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding for all bonds issued by the firm except bond i (in 
percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜ is a ratio of the daily number of shares on loan (shorted) for stock corresponding to bond issue i on day t to a number of shares outstanding (in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is 
a simple average of abnormal returns on bond i over the past 20 days (in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns on stock corresponding to bond issue i over the past 20 
days (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average over past 20 days of a trade imbalance of bond i defined as daily difference between buy and sell trading volumes scaled by the total trading 
volume of the bond (in percent). Control variables 𝑋௧௜ include: 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is defined as a sum of absolute daily returns on bond i over the past 20 days (annualized and expressed in 
percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is total daily number of bonds of issue i traded scaled by the total number of bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜ is the log value of total amount of bonds 
outstanding for bond issue i (in USD dollars); 𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  is time-to-maturity expressed in years; 𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜ is the log value of market capitalization of the firm issuing bond i (in USD dollars); 𝑏𝑚௧௜  is 
book-to-market ratio; 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ is defined as the sum of long-term and short-term debts divided by stockholders total equity; 𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜ institutional holding is defined as the number of shares 
held by institutional investors as recorded in 13F filings and are scaled by the total number of shares outstanding (in percent). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses are based on the time 
series of coefficient estimates from the cross-sectional regressions using Newey–West with 20 lags. 
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Table IA5 continued. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds  
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.43  
(-2.89) 
-0.45  
(-2.91) 
-0.35  
(-2.60) 
-0.34  
(-2.53)  
0.04  
(0.46) 
0.05  
(0.55) 
-0.01  
(-0.11) 
0.01  
(0.03)  
-0.53  
(-2.56) 
-0.55  
(-2.62) 
-0.47  
(-2.34) 
-0.49  
(-2.44) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-0.56  
(-2.56) 
-0.57  
(-2.58)      
0.23  
(1.54) 
0.21  
(1.44)      
-0.67  
(-2.42) 
-0.66  
(-2.40) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  
-0.41  
(-3.22) 
-0.43 
(-3.09) 
-0.30  
(-3.16) 
-0.30  
(-3.10)  
0.01  
(0.08) 
0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.06  
(-0.52) 
-0.07  
(-0.58)  
-0.79  
(-2.10) 
-0.77  
(-2.06) 
-0.36  
(-2.89) 
-0.34  
(-2.77) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.07  
(-7.38) 
-0.07  
(-7.20) 
-0.09  
(-7.24) 
-0.09  
(-7.02)  
-0.11  
(-9.34) 
-0.11  
(-9.01) 
-0.12  
(-10.6) 
-0.12  
(-10.3)  
-0.05  
(-3.71) 
-0.05  
(-3.66) 
-0.07  
(-4.21) 
-0.07  
(-4.11) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
7.30  
(9.87) 
7.25  
(9.84) 
7.31  
(10.3) 
7.22  
(10.2)  
6.49  
(9.29) 
6.37  
(9.09) 
6.44  
(9.39) 
6.28  
(9.16)  
8.25  
(9.04) 
8.33  
(9.14) 
8.30  
(7.93) 
8.37  
(9.95) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.01  
(-2.76)   
-0.01  
(-1.51)    
-0.02  
(-3.95)   
-0.02  
(-3.80)    
-0.01  
(-0.53)   
0.01  
(0.92) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.03  
(4.37) 
0.03  
(4.54) 
0.03  
(3.88) 
0.03  
(3.88)  
0.03  
(5.28) 
0.03  
(5.31) 
0.03  
(5.29) 
0.03  
(5.31)  
0.04  
(3.11) 
0.04  
(3.13) 
0.02  
(2.08) 
0.02  
(2.10) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
1.16  
(3.75) 
1.34  
(3.93) 
1.16  
(3.61) 
1.34  
(3.81)  
0.86  
(3.73) 
1.05  
(4.05) 
0.78  
(3.30) 
0.98  
(3.70)  
0.66  
(0.73) 
0.75  
(0.80) 
1.15  
(0.97) 
1.15  
(0.85) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  
-1.97  
(-1.97) 
-2.03  
(-2.07) 
-1.67  
(-1.92) 
-1.66  
(-1.90)  
-0.96  
(-1.34) 
-0.92  
(-1.33) 
-0.84  
(-1.18) 
-0.83  
(-1.18)  
-4.01  
(-2.02) 
-4.05  
(-2.00) 
-2.40  
(-1.79) 
-2.51  
(-1.80) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  
0.14  
(1.31) 
0.13  
(1.27) 
0.15  
(1.41) 
0.15  
(1.44)  
0.09  
(0.97) 
0.10  
(1.02) 
0.10  
(1.00) 
0.10  
(1.05)  
0.18  
(1.32) 
0.17  
(1.21) 
0.23  
(1.48) 
0.22  
(1.43) 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜  
1.65  
(2.53) 
1.68  
(2.61) 
1.64  
(2.39) 
1.67  
(2.46)  
0.37  
(0.53) 
0.37  
(0.54) 
0.22  
(0.33) 
0.25  
(0.36)  
0.23  
(0.22) 
0.27  
(0.25) 
0.30  
(0.98) 
0.29  
(0.96) 
𝑏𝑚௧௜  
-0.48 
(-0.65) 
-0.43 
(-0.58) 
-0.52 
(-0.71) 
-0.45 
(-0.62)  
0.16 
(0.28) 
0.20 
(0.34) 
0.10 
(0.17) 
0.16 
(0.27)  
-0.60 
(-0.56) 
-0.52 
(-0.49) 
-0.75 
(-0.66) 
-0.61 
(-0.55) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ 
-0.12 
(-0.94) 
-0.11 
(-0.91) 
-0.13 
(-0.95) 
-0.13 
(-0.92)  
-0.20 
(-1.75) 
-0.20 
(-1.72) 
-0.20 
(-1.62) 
-0.19 
(-1.58)  
0.26 
(1.00) 
0.25 
(0.97) 
0.30 
(0.98) 
0.29 
(0.96) 
𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜  
0.02 
(2.17) 
0.02 
(2.15) 
0.02 
(1.97) 
0.02 
(1.94)  
0.02  
(1.48) 
0.02 
(1.54) 
0.02 
(1.45) 
0.02 
(1.52)  
0.03 
(2.28) 
0.03 
(2.17) 
0.03 
(1.77) 
0.02 
(1.65) 
intercept -9.88  (-0.84) 
-9.92  
(-0.84) 
-12.09  
(-1.11) 
-13.01  
(-1.17)  
-0.68  
(-0.07) 
-1.44  
(-0.15) 
0.29  
(0.03) 
-0.49  
(-0.05)  
28.61  
(1.55) 
28.75  
(1.52) 
16.92  
(1.07) 
17.71  
(1.09) 
Adj. R2 11.80% 12.00% 12.53% 12.76%  15.16% 15.45% 15.25% 15.53%  15.93% 16.10% 18.30% 18.55% 
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Table IA5 continued. 
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds  
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.18  
(-2.63) 
-0.23  
(-1.92) 
-0.12  
(-2.89) 
-0.11  
(-2.68)  
0.07  
(0.51) 
0.08  
(0.63) 
-0.03  
(-0.86) 
-0.02  
(-0.48)  
-0.24  
(-2.40) 
-0.24 
(-2.44) 
-0.20  
(-2.47) 
-0.20  
(-2.54) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-0.21  
(-2.26) 
-0.22  
(-2.34)      
-0.09  
(-1.00) 
-0.10  
(-1.11)      
-0.26  
(-2.16) 
-0.26  
(-2.24) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  
-0.30  
(-1.59) 
-0.37  
(-1.56) 
-0.16  
(-1.12) 
-0.16  
(-1.18)  
-0.03  
(-0.14) 
-0.04  
(-0.16) 
-0.21  
(-1.40) 
-0.22  
(-1.42)  
-1.08  
(-1.19) 
-1.09  
(-1.20) 
-0.12  
(-0.82) 
-0.12  
(-0.85) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.07  
(-4.83) 
-0.07  
(-4.72) 
-0.08  
(-4.30) 
-0.07  
(-4.11)  
-0.12  
(-8.07) 
-0.11  
(-7.77) 
-0.13  
(-8.31) 
-0.13  
(-7.99)  
-0.04  
(-2.28) 
-0.05  
(-2.28) 
-0.04  
(-1.38) 
-0.04  
(-1.33) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
7.10  
(7.60) 
7.10  
(7.62) 
6.16  
(6.39) 
6.10  
(6.32)  
5.77  
(6.20) 
5.68  
(6.01) 
5.50  
(5.71) 
5.39  
(5.50)  
7.84  
(7.56) 
7.96  
(7.66) 
6.53  
(5.50) 
6.62  
(5.42) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.02  
(-3.27)   
-0.02  
(-4.07)    
-0.03  
(-4.86)   
-0.03  
(-4.96)    
0.01  
(0.61)   
0.01  
(0.73) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.01  
(1.36) 
0.01  
(1.81) 
0.01  
(1.50) 
0.01  
(1.54)  
0.02  
(3.31) 
0.02  
(3.45) 
0.02  
(3.02) 
0.02  
(3.14)  
0.01  
(0.71) 
0.01  
(0.69) 
0.01  
(0.64) 
0.01  
(0.62) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.08  
(0.28) 
0.22  
(0.76) 
0.03  
(0.10) 
0.10  
(0.33)  
0.19  
(1.20) 
0.30  
(1.79) 
0.11  
(0.75) 
0.23  
(1.41)  
-0.11  
(-0.13) 
-0.06  
(-0.07) 
-0.93  
(-0.70) 
-0.99  
(-0.69) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  
-0.84  
(-1.13) 
-1.11  
(-1.51) 
-1.01  
(-1.52) 
-1.01  
(-1.44)  
-0.64  
(-1.16) 
-0.61  
(-1.05) 
-0.49  
(-0.93) 
-0.46  
(-0.84)  
-2.65  
(-1.71) 
-2.49  
(-1.57) 
-2.69  
(-1.93) 
-2.60  
(-1.81) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.01  
(-0.17) 
-0.05  
(-0.62) 
-0.05  
(-0.60)  
-0.12  
(-1.49) 
-0.12  
(-1.48) 
-0.13  
(-1.57) 
-0.12  
(-1.56)  
0.28  
(2.79) 
0.28  
(2.89) 
0.26  
(2.15) 
0.27  
(2.23) 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜  
0.63  
(1.90) 
0.70  
(2.10) 
0.75  
(2.38) 
0.84  
(2.63)  
0.73  
(1.64) 
0.78  
(1.75) 
0.58  
(1.47) 
0.64  
(1.61)  
0.74  
(1.24) 
0.75  
(1.24) 
0.88  
(1.27) 
0.91  
(1.28) 
𝑏𝑚௧௜  
-1.51 
(-1.05) 
-1.45 
(-1.01) 
-1.49 
(-1.04) 
-1.43 
(-0.99)  
0.31 
(0.59) 
0.34 
(0.65) 
0.32 
(0.58) 
0.36 
(0.64)  
-2.06 
(-0.91) 
-1.89 
(-0.84) 
-1.90 
(-0.79) 
-1.64 
(-0.69) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ 
-0.31 
(-3.14) 
-0.29 
(-2.94) 
-0.33 
(-3.33) 
-0.32 
(-3.15)  
-0.24 
(-2.81) 
-0.23 
(-2.70) 
-0.24 
(-2.74) 
-0.23 
(-2.63)  
-0.55 
(-1.92) 
-0.55 
(-1.87) 
-0.58 
(-1.87) 
-0.57 
(-1.80) 
𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜  
0.03 
(3.02) 
0.03 
(2.90) 
0.03 
(2.98) 
0.03 
(2.84)  
0.02 
(2.35) 
0.02 
(2.31) 
0.02 
(2.34) 
0.02 
(2.28)  
0.05 
(2.64) 
0.05 
(2.53) 
0.05 
(2.42) 
0.05 
(2.26) 
intercept 1.21  (0.13) 
2.73  
(0.31) 
1.52  
(0.20) 
0.07  
(0.01)  
-3.98  
(-0.71) 
-5.41  
(-0.91) 
-2.87  
(-0.53) 
-4.25  
(-0.75)  
23.35  
(1.28) 
21.15  
(1.14) 
20.62  
(1.29) 
19.08  
(1.17) 
Adj. R2 8.71% 8.92% 10.37% 10.63%  12.78% 13.13% 13.64% 14.00%  11.34% 11.49% 14.93% 15.17% 
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Table IA5 continued. 
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds  
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-0.48  
(-2.33) 
-0.49  
(-2.37) 
-0.43  
(-2.33) 
-0.44  
(-2.38)  
-0.09  
(-0.87) 
-0.10  
(-0.94) 
-0.09  
(-0.89) 
-0.10  
(-0.95)  
-0.35  
(-1.76) 
-0.37  
(-1.88) 
-0.34  
(-1.69) 
-0.37  
(-1.85) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-0.44  
(-1.48) 
-0.44  
(-1.47)      
0.31  
(1.25) 
0.30  
(1.24)      
-0.54  
(-1.28) 
-0.54  
(-1.27) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  
-0.31  
(-2.02) 
-0.30  
(-1.90) 
-0.28  
(-2.26) 
-0.27  
(-2.13)  
0.13  
(0.72) 
0.12  
(0.67) 
0.14  
(0.83) 
0.13  
(0.76)  
-0.35  
(-1.74) 
-0.32  
(-1.55) 
-0.39  
(-2.33) 
-0.36  
(-2.12) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.07  
(-4.95) 
-0.07  
(-4.89) 
-0.08  
(-5.51) 
-0.08  
(-5.44)  
-0.10  
(-5.51) 
-0.10  
(-5.38) 
-0.11  
(-6.78) 
-0.11  
(-6.60)  
-0.07  
(-3.38) 
-0.07  
(-3.33) 
-0.09  
(-4.10) 
-0.09  
(-4.10) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
6.46  
(6.18) 
6.40  
(6.12) 
7.07  
(7.75) 
6.99  
(7.59)  
6.07  
(6.51) 
5.94  
(6.29) 
6.24  
(7.18) 
6.09  
(6.87)  
8.67  
(6.03) 
8.69  
(6.05) 
8.60  
(5.36) 
8.68  
(5.41) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.01  
(-0.43)   
0.01  
(0.31)    
-0.01 
(-1.55)   
-0.01  
(-1.57)    
0.01  
(0.31)   
0.02  
(1.12) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.04  
(3.75) 
0.04  
(3.75) 
0.03  
(3.20) 
0.03  
(3.18)  
0.04  
(4.21) 
0.04  
(4.15) 
0.03  
(4.34) 
0.03  
(4.25)  
0.04  
(2.68) 
0.04  
(2.74) 
0.03  
(1.74) 
0.03  
(1.76) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
1.72  
(3.86) 
1.90  
(3.79) 
1.83  
(3.88) 
2.00  
(3.81)  
1.32  
(3.64) 
1.56  
(3.78) 
1.26  
(3.26) 
1.46  
(3.39)  
0.96  
(0.80) 
0.89  
(0.73) 
2.13  
(1.40) 
2.06  
(1.32) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  
-0.45  
(-0.58) 
-0.47  
(-0.61) 
-0.24  
(-0.34) 
-0.29  
(-0.40)  
0.02  
(0.03) 
0.03  
(0.05) 
0.06  
(0.08) 
0.01  
(0.01)  
0.29  
(0.22) 
0.14  
(0.11) 
0.73  
(0.66) 
0.49  
(0.42) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  
0.33  
(3.03) 
0.33  
(3.00) 
0.37  
(3.51) 
0.37  
(3.49)  
0.32  
(3.11) 
0.33  
(3.12) 
0.34  
(3.23) 
0.34  
(3.25)  
0.36  
(2.58) 
0.35  
(2.53) 
0.45  
(2.96) 
0.44  
(2.94) 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜  
0.25  
(0.52) 
0.27  
(0.57) 
0.05  
(0.09) 
0.06  
(0.12)  
-1.46  
(-1.97) 
-1.43  
(-1.95) 
-1.45  
(-1.91) 
-1.44  
(-1.89)  
-3.21  
(-2.62) 
-3.17  
(-2.61) 
-4.03  
(-2.72) 
-3.95  
(-2.69) 
𝑏𝑚௧௜  
0.19 
(0.23) 
0.30 
(0.36) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
0.22 
(0.28)  
0.47 
(0.56) 
0.58 
(0.70) 
0.36 
(0.43) 
0.48 
(0.60)  
-0.04 
(-0.04) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.55 
(-0.48) 
-0.38 
(-0.36) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ 
0.22 
(1.45) 
0.22 
(1.48) 
0.27 
(1.64) 
0.28 
(1.66)  
0.04 
(0.32) 
0.04 
(0.39) 
0.08 
(0.67) 
0.08 
(0.73)  
0.99 
(2.71) 
0.98 
(2.66) 
1.12 
(2.56) 
1.14 
(2.56) 
𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜  
0.01 
(0.25) 
0.01 
(022) 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
-0.01 
(-0.13)  
-0.01 
(-0.32) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
-0.01 
(-0.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.54)  
0.03 
(1.34) 
0.02 
(1.22) 
0.02 
(1.16) 
0.02 
(0.96) 
intercept -11.94  (-1.43) 
-12.00  
(-1.46) 
-10.06  
(-1.32) 
-9.83  
(-1.29)  
12.42  
(1.70) 
13.00  
(1.71) 
11.85  
(1.70) 
12.29  
(1.76)  
14.10  
(0.91) 
16.00  
(0.98) 
22.39  
(1.29) 
24.50  
(1.36) 
Adj. R2 13.31% 13.50% 13.41% 13.61%  16.49% 16.73% 15.96% 16.16%  15.88% 16.05% 17.61% 17.83% 
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Table IA5 continued. 
Panel D: Lehman Period 
All Bonds  Investment-Grade Bonds  High-Yield Bonds  
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧௜  
-1.23  
(-1.30) 
-1.17  
(-1.76) 
-0.81  
(-0.94) 
-0.74 
(-0.84)  
0.71  
(1.30) 
0.79  
(1.76) 
0.56  
(0.99) 
0.65  
(1.20)  
-2.84  
(-1.85) 
-2.88  
(-0.63) 
-2.31  
(-1.56) 
-2.39  
(-1.58) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜      
-2.72  
(-2.04) 
-2.72  
(-2.06)      
1.10  
(2.07) 
1.00  
(2.00)      
-3.17  
(-2.16) 
-3.04  
(-2.11) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  
-1.44  
(-2.59) 
-1.44  
(-2.59) 
-1.06  
(-2.81) 
-1.02  
(-2.89)  
-0.46  
(-0.92) 
-0.48  
(-0.92) 
-0.56  
(-1.23) 
-0.55  
(-1.20)  
-2.09  
(-2.58) 
-2.05  
(-2.69) 
-1.20  
(-1.88) 
-1.15  
(-1.91) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.10  
(-3.00) 
-0.09  
(-2.71) 
-0.15  
(-2.56) 
-0.14  
(-2.38)  
-0.13  
(-3.33) 
-0.12  
(-3.10) 
-0.14  
(-3.01) 
-0.13  
(-2.80)  
0.02  
(0.39) 
0.02  
(0.50) 
-0.11  
(-1.63) 
-0.10  
(-1.50) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
12.96  
(4.96) 
12.78  
(4.98) 
13.55  
(4.75) 
13.21  
(4.75)  
11.94  
(4.21) 
11.72  
(4.32) 
11.49  
(3.78) 
11.08  
(3.86)  
7.55  
(2.35) 
7.86  
(2.46) 
13.87  
(3.99) 
14.24  
(4.10) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.05  
(-2.74)   
-0.02  
(-0.46)    
-0.05  
(-1.64)   
-0.04  
(-1.41)    
-0.11 
(-2.61)   
-0.03  
(-0.50) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.09  
(2.60) 
0.09  
(2.57) 
0.06  
(1.93) 
0.06  
(1.91)  
0.05  
(1.71) 
0.05  
(1.71) 
0.05  
(1.78) 
0.05  
(1.78)  
0.14  
(2.06) 
0.14  
(2.04) 
0.04  
(1.18) 
0.04  
(1.20) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
2.48  
(1.68) 
2.75  
(1.75) 
2.22  
(1.67) 
2.71  
(1.88)  
0.97  
(0.94) 
1.21  
(1.07) 
0.82  
(0.86) 
1.32  
(1.23)  
2.19  
(0.34) 
3.28  
(0.50) 
4.18  
(0.58) 
4.82  
(0.67) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  
-15.40  
(-2.06) 
-14.79  
(-2.00) 
-12.63  
(-1.94) 
-12.19  
(-1.86)  
-7.93  
(-1.51) 
-7.28  
(-1.45) 
-7.50  
(-1.43) 
-7.11  
(-1.39)  
-34.28  
(-2.41) 
-34.56  
(-2.36) 
-19.10  
(-2.07) 
-19.29  
(-1.96) 
𝑡𝑡𝑚௧௜  
-0.39  
(-0.48) 
-0.37  
(-0.44) 
-0.30  
(-0.36) 
-0.26  
(-0.32)  
-0.33  
(-0.46) 
-0.29  
(-0.41) 
-0.33  
(-0.46) 
-0.29  
(-0.40)  
-1.20  
(-1.15) 
-1.31  
(-1.20) 
-1.17  
(-0.99) 
-1.22 
(-1.03) 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜  
13.98  
(3.89) 
13.78  
(3.92) 
14.43  
(3.82) 
14.33  
(3.82)  
9.34  
(2.13) 
9.01  
(2.11) 
8.33  
(1.95) 
8.28  
(1.94)  
17.90  
(4.01) 
17.99  
(3.98) 
17.22  
(3.72) 
17.17  
(3.68) 
𝑏𝑚௧௜  
-0.02 
(-0.01) 
-0.28 
(-0.10) 
-0.05 
(-0.02) 
-0.31 
(-0.15)  
-2.22  
(-0.67) 
-2.55 
(-0.77) 
-2.28 
(-0.62) 
-2.52 
(-0.70)  
2.21 
(0.95) 
1.62 
(0.76) 
2.83 
(0.91) 
2.37 
(0.83) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ 
-1.24 
(-1.65) 
-1.32 
(-1.76) 
-1.61 
(-2.02) 
-1.69 
(-2.11)  
-1.40 
(-1.63) 
-1.48 
(-1.76) 
-1.58 
(-1.81) 
-1.64 
(-1.89)  
-0.57 
(-0.55) 
-0.64 
(-0.63) 
-0.79 
(-0.63) 
-0.97 
(-0.78) 
𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜  
0.12 
(3.45) 
0.12 
(3.59) 
0.12 
(4.00) 
0.13 
(4.23)  
0.12 
(3.20) 
0.13 
(3.47) 
0.14 
(3.45) 
0.15 
(3.71)  
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
-0.05 
(-0.69) 
-0.04 
(-0.57) 
intercept -44.14  (-0.40) 
-49.50  
(-0.45) 
-80.35  
(-0.80) 
-85.59  
(-0.84)  
-62.06  
(-0.72) 
-65.83  
(-0.75) 
-52.88  
(-0.61) 
-58.15  
(-0.66)  
133.7  
(0.85) 
136.1  
(0.85) 
-29.79  
(-0.25) 
-26.90  
(-0.22) 
Adj. R2 15.95% 16.20% 16.46% 16.75%  17.35% 17.70% 17.84% 18.20%  19.84% 20.15% 19.49% 19.75% 
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Table IA6: Do Bond Short Sellers Have Information about Stock Returns? Cross-Sectional Regressions 
This table presents Fama-MacBeth regressions predicting 20-day stock abnormal returns. Each day we estimate the following cross-sectional predictive regression: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ାଶ,௧ାଶଵ௜ = 𝛼ଵ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜ + 𝛼ଶ௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜ + 𝛼ଷ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛼ସ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑 + 𝛼ହ௧𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜ + 𝛾௧ 𝑋௧௜ + 𝑢௧௜ . 
We average then each coefficient over time-series dimension. The sample consists of all corporate bonds that have the corresponding stock traded, have entries in the Markit securities lending 
database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011. Stocks that are in the upper market capitalization quintile 
across the sample five days prior to the sorting are categorized as Large stocks; stocks that are in the lowest market capitalization quintile are categorized as Small stocks. Pre-Lehman period 
(Panel B) consists of all trading days from  January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period (Panel C) is from January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) 
is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. Dependent variable is a simple average of abnormal stock returns over the future 20 days defined as a raw return minus the return from the 
corresponding size and book-to-market matching portfolio (annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜   is an average value-weighted ratio of the daily number of bonds on loan 
(shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding for all bonds issued by the firm except bond i (in percent); 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜  is a ratio of the daily number of shares on loan 
(shorted) for stock corresponding to bond issue i on day t to a number of shares outstanding (in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns on bond i over the past 20 days 
(in percent); 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns on stock corresponding to bond issue i over the past 20 days (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is a simple average over past 20 
days of a trade imbalance of stock i defined as daily difference between buy and sell trading volumes scaled by the total trading volume of the stock (in percent). Control variables 𝑋௧௜ include: 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is defined as a sum of absolute daily returns on stock i over the past 20 days (annualized and expressed in percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  is total daily number of shares of stock i 
traded scaled by the total number of shares outstanding (in percent); 𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜ is the log value of market capitalization of the firm i (in USD dollars); 𝑏𝑚௧௜  is book-to-market ratio; 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ is 
defined as the sum of long-term and short-term debts divided by stockholders total equity; 𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜ institutional holding is defined as the number of shares held by institutional investors as 
recorded in 13F filings and are scaled by the total number of shares outstanding (in percent). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses are based on the time series of coefficient estimates from 
the cross-sectional regressions using Newey–West with 20 lags. 
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Table IA6 continued. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
All Stocks Large Stocks Small Stocks 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  
0.24  
(0.45) 
0.10  
(0.20) 
0.25  
(0.49) 
0.29  
(0.60) 
-0.37  
(-0.16) 
-0.63  
(-0.28) 
-0.46  
(-0.19) 
-0.80  
(-0.35) 
0.03  
(0.06) 
-0.02  
(-0.04) 
0.09  
(0.17) 
0.23  
(0.43) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜      
-0.75  
(-2.21) 
-0.79  
(-2.29)     
0.12  
(0.18) 
0.16  
(0.24)     
-1.41  
(-2.53) 
-1.44  
(-2.93) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.01  
(0.56) 
0.01  
(0.94) 
0.01  
(0.84) 
0.01  
(0.82) 
0.02  
(0.73) 
0.03  
(1.36) 
0.02  
(0.96) 
0.03  
(1.27) 
0.00  
(0.01) 
0.00  
(0.10) 
0.00  
(0.17) 
0.00  
(0.03) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.01  
(-0.11) 
-0.01  
(-0.18) 
-0.01  
(-0.12) 
-0.01  
(-0.15) 
-0.01  
(-0.10) 
-0.03  
(-0.26) 
-0.05  
(-0.45) 
-0.06  
(-0.56) 
-0.01  
(-0.33) 
-0.01  
(-0.46) 
0.00  
(0.06) 
-0.00  
(-0.08) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.09  
(-0.34)   
-0.13  
(-0.49)   
0.22  
(0.26)   
0.53  
(0.66)   
0.56  
(1.74)   
0.51  
(1.59) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.01  
(-0.10) 
0.10  
(0.20) 
-0.03  
(-0.40) 
-0.02  
(-0.31) 
-0.05  
(-0.31) 
-0.63  
(-0.28) 
0.06  
(0.35) 
0.07  
(0.36) 
-0.23  
(-1.00) 
-0.02  
(-0.04) 
-0.28  
(-1.20) 
-0.28  
(-1.22) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-3.22  
(-2.12) 
-2.37  
(-1.51) 
-1.49  
(-0.94) 
-2.02  
(-1.22) 
-2.50  
(-0.37) 
-2.36  
(-0.36) 
-4.69  
(-0.58) 
-6.00 
(-0.76) 
-1.88  
(-0.74) 
-1.20  
(-0.46) 
0.33  
(0.13) 
-0.31  
(-0.11) 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜  
-1.86  
(-2.32) 
-1.72  
(-2.23) 
-2.68  
(-3.41) 
4.70  
(0.67) 
-27.76  
(-2.86) 
-26.77  
(-2.74) 
-32.51  
(-3.24) 
24.25  
(1.13) 
0.18  
(0.17) 
0.18  
(0.17) 
-0.85  
(-0.81) 
0.12  
(0.02) 
𝑏𝑚௧௜  
2.44  
(1.10) 
2.47  
(1.11) 
2.84  
(1.30) 
2.79  
(1.28) 
-0.44  
(-0.10) 
-1.94  
(-0.43) 
-6.35  
(-1.23) 
-7.59  
(-1.46) 
4.43  
(1.84) 
4.44  
(1.88) 
4.30  
(1.70) 
4.20  
(1.68) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ 
0.53 
(1.54) 
0.50 
(1.49) 
0.60 
(1.76) 
0.64 
(1.85)  
1.73 
(1.70) 
1.28 
(1.21) 
1.68 
(1.61) 
1.27 
(1.19)  
-0.40 
(-1.04) 
-0.43 
(-1.13) 
-0.40 
(-1.08) 
-0.36 
(-0.95) 
𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜  
0.02 
(0.36) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
0.04 
(0.57) 
0.05 
(0.67)  
0.23 
(1.03) 
0.24 
(1.17) 
0.21 
(0.92) 
0.24 
(1.18)  
0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.00 
(-0.01) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
Intercept 27.76  (1.89) 
26.01  
(1.82) 
40.52  
(2.88) 
38.40  
(2.79) 
330.9  
(2.80) 
318.5  
(2.67) 
392.0  
(3.18) 
371.2  
(2.97) 
-2.49  
(-0.12) 
-1.50  
(-0.07) 
17.38  
(0.87) 
16.93  
(0.85) 
Adj. R2 7.19% 7.33% 7.66% 7.87% 13.84% 14.86% 15.12% 15.79% 8.68% 8.85% 9.32% 9.51% 
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Table IA6 continued. 
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
All Stocks Large Stocks Small Stocks 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  
-0.04  
(-0.05) 
-0.18  
(-0.20) 
-0.11  
(-0.13) 
-0.24  
(-0.29) 
-0.39  
(-0.09) 
-1.13  
(-0.27) 
-0.45  
(-0.10) 
-1.33  
(-0.31) 
-0.51  
(-0.57) 
-0.50  
(-0.56) 
-0.50  
(-0.56) 
-0.48  
(-0.54) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜      
-0.29  
(-0.66) 
-0.26  
(-0.60)     
0.38  
(0.38) 
0.43  
(0.46)     
-1.25  
(-2.50) 
-1.22  
(-2.43) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.02  
(-1.64) 
-0.02  
(-1.27) 
-0.02  
(-1.43) 
-0.02  
(-1.25) 
-0.02  
(-0.62) 
0.02  
(0.54) 
-0.01  
(-0.20) 
0.01  
(0.42) 
-0.02  
(-1.50) 
-0.02  
(-1.55) 
-0.02  
(-1.26) 
-0.02  
(-1.31) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.01  
(0.43) 
0.01  
(0.33) 
0.01  
(0.44) 
0.01  
(0.36) 
-0.08  
(-0.49) 
-0.06  
(-0.37) 
-0.11  
(-0.67) 
-0.09  
(-0.54) 
0.04  
(1.07) 
0.04  
(1.05) 
0.04  
(1.19) 
0.04  
(1.16) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.30  
(-0.71)   
-0.30  
(-0.74)   
-1.56  
(-1.36)   
-1.21  
(-1.11)   
0.73  
(1.65)   
0.66  
(1.49) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.01  
(0.11) 
-0.00  
(-0.02) 
-0.01  
(-0.09) 
-0.01  
(-0.13) 
-0.13  
(-0.65) 
-0.19  
(-0.88) 
-0.09  
(-0.40) 
-0.09  
(-0.40) 
-0.55  
(-1.74) 
-0.55  
(-1.76) 
-0.59  
(-1.86) 
-0.59  
(-1.89) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-2.64  
(-1.73) 
-2.44  
(-1.63) 
-1.85  
(-1.20) 
-1.81  
(-1.18) 
0.74  
(0.07) 
1.63  
(0.16) 
-1.36  
(-0.12) 
-1.75  
(-0.15) 
3.22  
(1.10) 
3.43  
(1.16) 
4.68  
(1.62) 
4.80  
(1.63) 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜  
-3.47  
(-3.06) 
-3.28  
(-3.09) 
-3.68  
(-3.78) 
-3.46  
(-3.81) 
-42.80  
(-2.84) 
-42.47  
(-2.81) 
-49.99  
(-3.26) 
-48.71  
(-3.13) 
-1.04  
(-0.83) 
-0.98  
(-0.78) 
-1.85  
(-1.42) 
-1.81  
(-1.40) 
𝑏𝑚௧௜  
4.27  
(2.22) 
4.07  
(2.09) 
4.25  
(2.24) 
4.09  
(2.16) 
4.82  
(3.45) 
1.35  
(0.22) 
-2.53  
(-0.38) 
-4.79  
(-0.71) 
1.44  
(0.52) 
1.49  
(0.54) 
0.58  
(0.21) 
0.57  
(0.20) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ 
1.61 
(3.99) 
1.61 
(4.04) 
1.61 
(4.10) 
1.61 
(4.11)  
-39.24 
(-0.09) 
4.37 
(2.84) 
4.17 
(2.87) 
3.84 
(2.49)  
0.19 
(0.38) 
0.16 
(0.33) 
0.24 
(0.49) 
0.20 
(0.41) 
𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜  
-0.07 
(-0.91) 
-0.07 
(-0.92) 
-0.07 
(-0.89) 
-0.07 
(-0.86)  
0.26 
(0.90) 
0.29 
(1.02) 
0.10 
(0.33) 
0.13 
(0.44)  
-0.06 
(-0.87) 
-0.06 
(-0.85) 
-0.07 
(-0.95) 
-0.06 
(-0.88) 
intercept 57.46  (2.90) 
54.42 
(2.87) 
61.44  
(3.52) 
57.78  
(3.45) 
510.5  
(2.73) 
507.7  
(2.73) 
608.1  
(3.22) 
592.0  
(3.11) 
21.83  
(0.84) 
20.75  
(0.80) 
37.26  
(1.40) 
36.25  
(1.37) 
Adj. R2 6.67% 6.91% 7.13% 7.37% 11.66% 12.62% 12.40% 12.92% 8.33% 8.33% 8.67% 8.71% 
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Table IA6 continued. 
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
All Stocks Large Stocks Small Stocks 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  
0.47  
(1.37) 
0.27  
(0.65) 
0.39  
(1.14) 
0.68  
(1.81) 
-0.01  
(-0.01) 
0.14  
(0.12) 
-0.35  
(-0.27) 
-0.21  
(-0.17) 
0.38  
(1.44) 
0.18  
(0.52) 
0.30  
(1.13) 
0.59  
(1.83) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜      
-0.75  
(-2.29) 
-0.93  
(-2.44)     
-0.04  
(-0.02) 
0.12  
(0.07)     
-1.16  
(-1.89) 
-1.26  
(-1.93) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.03  
(1.72) 
0.04  
(1.98) 
0.04  
(1.91) 
0.03  
(1.73) 
0.07  
(1.76) 
0.06  
(1.60) 
0.07  
(1.76) 
0.06  
(1.63) 
0.01  
(0.41) 
0.02  
(0.56) 
0.01  
(0.49) 
0.01  
(0.31) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.01  
(0.30) 
0.01  
(0.30) 
0.01  
(0.40) 
0.01  
(0.42) 
0.12  
(0.97) 
0.06  
(0.49) 
0.06  
(0.51) 
0.01  
(0.11) 
-0.07  
(-1.52) 
-0.08  
(-1.72) 
-0.05  
(-1.18) 
-0.06  
(-1.38) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
0.17 
(0.64)   
0.08  
(0.29)   
2.66  
(2.35)   
2.78  
(2.60)   
0.34  
(0.80)   
0.26  
(0.60) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.04  
(-0.29) 
-0.05  
(-0.34) 
-0.08  
(-0.51) 
-0.06  
(-0.36) 
-0.06  
(-0.18) 
-0.00  
(-0.01) 
0.20  
(0.58) 
0.21  
(0.58) 
0.12  
(0.31) 
0.10  
(0.26) 
0.07  
(0.17) 
0.07  
(0.17) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-4.60  
(-1.48) 
-2.67  
(-0.80) 
-1.95  
(-0.62) 
-3.38  
(-1.00) 
-8.09  
(-0.83) 
-7.39  
(-0.81) 
-12.29  
(-0.99) 
-13.43  
(-1.13) 
-4.62  
(-1.06) 
-3.09  
(-0.70) 
-1.88  
(-0.44) 
-3.69  
(-0.81) 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜  
-1.41  
(-1.36) 
-1.28  
(-1.23) 
-2.31  
(-1.88) 
-2.31  
(-1.86) 
7.60  
(0.73) 
8.01  
(0.73) 
5.54  
(0.48) 
6.01  
(0.51) 
1.53  
(1.06) 
1.46  
(1.05) 
0.65  
(0.46) 
0.69  
(0.49) 
𝑏𝑚௧௜  
-5.31  
(-1.28) 
-4.95  
(-1.19) 
-4.59  
(-1.12) 
-4.51  
(-1.11) 
-6.54  
(-0.89) 
-6.33  
(-0.86) 
-12.64  
(-1.40) 
-13.04  
(-1.39) 
6.53  
(1.58) 
6.94  
(1.72) 
8.21  
(1.75) 
8.18  
(1.79) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ 
-1.14 
(-2.20) 
-1.21 
(-2.39) 
-1.01 
(-1.9) 
-0.90 
(-1.56)  
-2.49 
(-2.18) 
-3.03 
(-2.84) 
-1.93 
(-1.46) 
-2.50 
(-2.04)  
-0.51 
(-0.86) 
-0.59 
(-0.99) 
-0.51 
(-0.89) 
-0.40 
(-0.64) 
𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜  
0.11 
(1.24) 
0.09 
(0.94) 
0.12 
(1.33) 
0.13 
(1.53)  
-0.19 
(-0.70) 
-0.13 
(-0.53) 
-0.11 
(-0.42) 
-0.00 
(-0.01)  
0.10 
(1.01) 
0.09 
(0.81) 
0.07 
(0.66) 
0.09 
(0.92) 
intercept 22.83  (1.22) 
21.83  
(1.17) 
37.57  
(1.77) 
36.63 
(1.70) 
-57.64  
(-0.43) 
-69.85  
(-0.49) 
-0.11  
(-0.23) 
-0.00  
(-0.01) 
-33.08  
(-1.06) 
-29.67  
(-0.97) 
-14.61  
(-0.50) 
-15.29  
(-0.52) 
Adj. R2 6.34% 6.49% 6.77% 6.96% 16.09% 17.25% 18.44% 19.37% 7.81% 8.30% 8.50% 8.99% 
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Table IA6 continued. 
Panel D: Lehman Period 
All Stocks Large Stocks Small Stocks 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧௜  
0.89  
(0.51) 
0.99  
(0.59) 
1.69  
(1.11) 
1.75  
(1.18) 
-1.77  
(-0.52) 
-0.96  
(-0.28) 
-0.94  
(-0.29) 
-0.27  
(-0.08) 
1.67  
(0.68) 
1.83  
(0.76) 
2.63  
(1.25) 
2.81  
(1.36) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧௜      
-3.68  
(-1.68) 
-3.20  
(-1.64)     
-2.68  
(-1.03) 
-2.26  
(-0.93)     
-3.32  
(-0.99) 
-3.33  
(-0.99) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.04  
(0.71) 
0.04  
(0.71) 
0.04  
(0.86) 
0.04  
(0.85) 
-0.01  
(-0.10) 
-0.01  
(-0.15) 
-0.00  
(-0.03) 
-0.01  
(-0.14) 
0.07  
(0.90) 
0.07  
(0.92) 
0.07  
(1.02) 
0.07  
(1.05) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-0.13  
(-1.53) 
-0.13  
(-1.51) 
-0.15  
(-1.65) 
-0.15  
(-1.63) 
-0.12  
(-0.37) 
-0.17  
(-0.56) 
-0.11  
(-0.33) 
-0.15  
(-0.47) 
-0.01  
(-0.18) 
-0.01  
(-0.18) 
0.00  
(0.05) 
0.01  
(0.06) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜    
-0.03  
(-0.03)   
-0.06  
(-0.05)   
0.38  
(0.11)   
1.27  
(0.36)   
0.41  
(0.32)   
0.60  
(0.48) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
0.06  
(0.48) 
0.06  
(0.47) 
0.05  
(0.39) 
0.05  
(0.37) 
0.43  
(1.88) 
0.46  
(1.96) 
0.38  
(1.66) 
0.41  
(1.77) 
0.13  
(0.96) 
0.14  
(1.02) 
0.07  
(0.40) 
0.07  
(0.45) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘௧ିଶ଴,௧௜  
-1.08  
(-0.22) 
-1.06  
(-0.21) 
2.09  
(0.32) 
2.03  
(0.31) 
2.18  
(0.10) 
-4.03  
(-0.19) 
8.02  
(0.36) 
0.98  
(0.05) 
-20.32  
(-3.03) 
-20.44  
(-2.96) 
-16.06  
(-1.60) 
-16.20  
(-1.58) 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑎𝑝௧௜  
5.67  
(2.87) 
5.56  
(2.86) 
1.70  
(0.52) 
1.63  
(0.52) 
-88.41  
(-7.19) 
-81.29  
(-6.50) 
-90.20  
(-7.44) 
-83.40  
(-6.44) 
1.63  
(0.26) 
1.57  
(0.25) 
-1.26  
(-0.20) 
-1.39  
(-0.22) 
𝑏𝑚௧௜  
24.27  
(4.82) 
24.18  
(4.78) 
25.72  
(5.81) 
25.73  
(5.83) 
-3.64  
(-0.26) 
-3.01  
(-0.23) 
-2.48  
(-0.18) 
-1.36  
(-0.11) 
11.09  
(1.14) 
10.29  
(1.00) 
8.50  
(0.95) 
7.74  
(0.81) 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௧௜ 
1.31 
(1.79) 
1.38 
(1.90) 
1.52 
(1.88) 
1.58 
(1.96)  
1.78 
(0.48) 
1.63 
(0.46) 
2.61 
(0.73) 
2.36 
(0.69)  
-3.26  
(-2.61) 
-3.10  
(-2.46) 
-3.53  
(-3.57) 
-3.36  
(-3.37) 
𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔௧௜  
0.19 
(0.48) 
0.18 
(0.45) 
1.52 
(1.88) 
1.58 
(1.96)  
1.83 
(1.88) 
1.61 
(1.82) 
2.22 
(2.18) 
1.97 
(2.16)  
-0.02 
(-0.08) 
-0.04 
(-0.14) 
-0.02 
(-0.06) 
-0.03 
(-0.11) 
intercept -125.5  (-2.83) 
-123.0  
(-2.84) 
-71.91  
(-1.28) 
-70.17  
(-1.30) 
912.0  
(6.28) 
8.45.0  
(5.42) 
920.1  
(6.34) 
855.1  
(5.25) 
-14.44  
(-0.15) 
-12.00  
(-0.12) 
35.14  
(0.39) 
38.28  
(0.43) 
Adj. R2 13.33% 13.41% 14.60% 14.67% 17.27% 18.10% 17.19% 17.60% 14.53% 14.30% 16.70% 16.47% 
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Table IA7: Explaining Bond Short Interest: Cross-Sectional Regressions 
This table presents Fama-MacBeth regression of 5-day bond short interest. Each day we estimate the following cross-
sectional regression: 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଶ,௧ା଺௜ = 𝛼ଵ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛ + 𝛼ଶ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪ + 𝛼ଷ௧𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜ + 𝛼ସ௧𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜
+ 𝛼ହ௧𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜ + 𝛼଺௧𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜ + 𝛼଻௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜ + 𝛼଼௧𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜
+ 𝛼ଽ௧𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜ + 𝛼ଵ଴ 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜ + 𝛼ଵଵ௧𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜ + 𝑢௧௜ . 
We average then each coefficient over time-series dimension. The sample consists of all corporate bonds in the Markit 
securities lending database for which corresponding data is available in the FISD and TRACE databases and the issuer’s 
stock from January 1, 2006 to December 30, 2011. Bonds with Moody’s credit rating of ‘Baa-3’ and higher five days prior to 
the sorting are categorized as Investment-Grade Bonds; others are categorized as High-Yield Bonds. Pre-Lehman period 
(Panel B) consists of all trading days from  January 1, 2006 to May 31, 2008, the post-Lehman period (Panel C) is from 
January 1, 2009 to December 30, 2011 and the Lehman period (Panel D) is from June 1, 2008 to December 30, 2008. 
Dependent variable 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଶ,௧ା଺௜  is a simple average of bond short interest over the future 5 days defined a ratio of the 
daily number of bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding (expressed in percent). 
To define 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛  and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪  variables, we sort bonds on day t into terciles based on 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜ ,  where 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  is a simple average of abnormal returns on bond i over the past 5 days (in percent). 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛ = 1 if the 
bond abnormal return over the past 5 trading days falls into the highest tercile and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛ = 0 otherwise. Similarly, 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪ = 1 if the bond abnormal return over the past 5 trading days falls into the lowest tercile and 𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,ହ௟௢௪ =
0 otherwise; 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜  is simple average over the past 5 days of an average value-weighted ratio of the daily number 
of bonds on loan (shorted) for bond issue i on day t to the number of bonds outstanding for all bonds issued by the firm 
except bond i (in percent); 𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  is a simple average over past and future 5 days of a trade imbalance of bond i 
defined as daily difference between buy and sell trading volumes scaled by the total trading volume of the bond (in percent); 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  is defined as a sum of absolute daily returns on bond i over the past and future 5 days respectively (daily 
and expressed in percent); 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  is total daily number of bonds of issue i traded scaled by the total number of 
bonds outstanding (in percent); 𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜ is the log value of total amount of bonds outstanding for bond issue i (in USD 
dollars). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses are based on the time series of coefficient estimates from the cross-
sectional regressions using Newey–West with 20 lags. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 All Bonds IG Bonds HY Bonds 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛  0.025 (5.92) 0.026 (6.16) 0.013 (1.61) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪  0.025 (5.47) 0.014 (2.97) 0.023 (3.13) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.323 (43.0) 0.29 (35.3) 0.453 (39.73) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  -1.107 (-2.05) 0.31 (0.54) -2.998 (-3.14) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  4.312 (6.41) 4.063 (6.20) 6.486 (4.17) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  1.114 (3.96) 1.595 (4.72) 1.410 (2.87) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  0.139 (0.30) 1.944 (3.77) 7.669 (0.98) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  0.001 (0.43) -0.007 (-3.51) 0.027 (6.8) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  0.923 (3.12) 0.515 (1.68) 1.669 (3.53) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.960 (227.5) 0.957 (195.6) 0.963 (229.8) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜  0.011 (7.13) 0.009 (4.73) 0.009 (3.42) 
Adj. R2 91.87% 91.04% 93.15% 
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Table IA7 continued. 
Panel B: Pre-Lehman Period 
 All Bonds IG Bonds HY Bonds 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛  0.013 (1.77) 0.014 (2.01) -0.007 (-0.45) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪  0.039 (4.72) 0.027 (3.06) 0.036 (2.76) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.302 (28.7) 0.253 (21.36) 0.47 (27.3) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  -2.076 (-1.72) 0.435 (0.35) -5.268 (-2.47) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  5.715 (7.27) 5.043 (7.08) 9.535 (3.90) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  0.360 (0.71) 0.819 (1.43) 0.768 (0.80) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  -0.912 (-0.90) 1.316 (1.18) 17.50 (0.94) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  0.004 (1.2) -0.009 (-2.21) 0.042 (6.26) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  1.702 (2.65) 0.844 (1.24) 3.010 (3.04) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.979 (203.0) 0.979 (185.0) 0.976 (175.4) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜  0.006 (3.89) 0.006 (2.77) 0.006 (2.92) 
Adj. R2 93.37% 93.33% 93.47% 
    
Panel C: Post-Lehman Period 
 All Bonds IG Bonds HY Bonds 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛  0.032 (7.82) 0.035 (8.21) 0.028 (3.57) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪  0.011 (3.39) 0.002 (0.63) 0.018 (2.34) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.354 (41.62) 0.329 (37.5) 0.455 (30.4) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  -0.160 (-0.60) 0.402 (0.87) -0.895 (-2.60) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  3.610 (3.28) 3.782 (3.44) 5.735 (2.74) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  1.369 (4.87) 1.621 (4.86) 2.172 (5.01) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  0.936 (3.21) 2.657 (7.21) 0.425 (1.04) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  0.354 (41.62) 0.329 (37.5) 0.455 (30.4) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  0.405 (2.33) 0.291 (1.46) 0.884 (2.55) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.953 (229.0) 0.950 (200.0) 0.957 (193.3) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜  0.015 (6.14) 0.015 (5.76) 0.010 (2.29) 
Adj. R2 90.96% 89.84% 92.74% 
        
Panel D: Lehman Period 
 All Bonds IG Bonds HY Bonds 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧
௛௜௚௛  0.044 (2.21) 0.036 (1.58) 0.019 (1.12) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௟௢௪  0.034 (1.55) 0.019 (0.87) -0.014 (-0.49) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.254 (12.09) 0.247 (14.5) 0.357 (10.1) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  -1.776 (-3.14) -0.831 (-2.22) -3.909 (-3.04) 
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  1.439 (0.83) 0.847 (0.44) -4.206 (-1.29) 
𝑙𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡௧௜  3.364 (4.77) 5.261 (4.76) 0.185 (0.11) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  0.730 (1.63) 0.954 (1.36) 0.906 (2.76) 
𝑜𝑖𝑏 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  -0.007 (-0.82) -0.015 (-1.94) 0.034 (2.50) 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ାଵ,௧ାହ௜  0.065 (0.20) 0.179 (0.36) -0.424 (-0.97) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑑௧ିହ,௧௜  0.908 (40.7) 0.890 (34.4) 0.933 (43.1) 
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚௧ିହ,௧௜  0.010 (2.13) -0.008 (-0.81) 0.011 (1.22) 
Adj. R2 89.76% 86.72% 93.96% 
 
 
